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Economy overview at the beginning of the year 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
The new year of 2003 has begun with the Government sizing up of the previous year. Positive 
estimates prevail. It is the third year in a row when the Republic of Moldova registers GDP 
growth (7.2% in 2002 and altogether during the “triennial period of growth” of 2000-2002 – 
16.4%); industry and agriculture growth was correspondingly 10.6% and 3.0%. Nevertheless, 
share of services within the GDP structure is much larger than share of the production sphere; 
while 70% of budget incomes were provided by the customs. The Government lays a particular 
emphasis on social character of its actions: average monthly wage increased by 32.3% and 
reached 666,4 MDL and average pension – 168 MDL. For all that minimal basket of goods in 
December 2002 was officially estimated as 1177 MDL. The National bank has played its 
traditional role as the key structure that stabilizes macroeconomic situation through providing for 
stability of the Moldovan lei (13,5 MDL for 1 USD in 2002 as compared to 12,9 MDL in 2001) 
and inflation of only 4.4%. Monetary reserves of the National bank have been raised up to 264 
mil USD through purchase of currency transferred into the country by the Moldovan citizens 
working abroad inclusively (more than 200 mil USD in 2002). 
 
But some facts can put one on guard: internal and external state debt has increased; export was 
1,6 times smaller than import; investments – a precondition for the future – grew only by 4.0%, 
which is less than GDP growth; the state did not obtain from privatization even a tenth part of 
what was planned during the budget approval; business environment still remains unfavorable.  
 
Majority of the population, according to opinion polls, evaluated positively tendencies of the 
country’s socio-economic development and actions of the Government. These actions, however, 
in spite of their abundance (circa 30 strategies, programmes and concepts) were focused mainly 
on solution of current issues. This was also reflected by a record number (about 1800!) of 
Government decisions on different issues of public management made in 2002.  
 
But there is an overall impression that the present Government (even after almost two years of its 
activity) has not succeeded yet in determining the degree of “state regulation” (leitmotif of its 
starting Programme, April 2001) and “freedom of market mechanisms action”, especially in the 
sphere of entrepreneurship, which is the market economy driving force, while private sector 
provides for almost 85% of GDP. Lack of clarity and contradictoriness of the Government 
economic policy are main causes of its long-drawn “haggle” with the IMF and the World Bank 
regarding further loans. Thus, the second SAC-III transfer instead of November-December 2002 
will be rendered to Moldova in April at best.  
 
On the whole, regular activity of the Parliament and the Government, macroeconomic 
tendencies and current events of January-February of 2003 still follow trajectory of the last 
year. Among laws that joined into force since the beginning of the year are: on migration, on 
additional social protection of pensioners, on public communal services, on petitions, on 
copyright. There were introduced amendments into the laws on education, on state regulation of 
external trade, on procurement of goods, work and services for state necessities, on sanitary-and-
epidemiologic protection of the population, on payment for pollution of the environment.  
 
The Government issued during January-February almost 200 decisions, including decisions on 
approval of the Unified programme for compulsory medical insurance (which is being 
introduced since July 1, 2003) and of the Concept of corporate management of enterprises. It 
seems that the Government responding to the directive expressed in the Parliament by the 
President V. Voronin on “modernization of state management, liberalization of the economy and 
activization of civil society resources” (according to the monitoring of 9365 documents 
registered by the State Chancellery) issued decision on results of execution of normative acts, 
decrees and commissions of the President of the Republic of Moldova in 2002 by central public 
management bodies (#126, 10.02.2003), which points to “indifference and irresponsibility of 
persons bound to execute them” and that “leadership of central public management bodies 
became less exigent towards responsible officials”, etc.  
 
Events in the real economy and social development meanwhile took their normal course. The 
Department of Statistics registered in January, 2003, that industrial production grew by 13% and 
inflation index – by 1.9%. State budget as regards incomes was executed by 125%. It is 
important that an international agency – Fitch Ratings – raised Moldova's long-term external 
obligations rating from “DD” (risk of default) up to “B-”, i.e. up to the indicator that now is 
attributed to Uruguay, Lebanon and Gambia (Moldova had such rating in 1999 after the 
Russian/regional financial crisis).  
 
Year of 2003, unlike other previous years, began in expectation of positive changes in solution of 
the “Transnistrian problem” and, hence, in rapprochement of economies of Moldova and 
Transnistria. The causes were both the idea of federalization of a “common state” proposed in 
Kiev by the OSCE and guarantor-countries, decision of the OSCE summit in Porto on removal 
out of the region of the Russian military equipment till the end of 2003, as well as new 
tendencies in Transnitria’s economy – beginning of a monetary privatization of enterprises, 
referendum on private property for land, changes in social policy, etc. And, finally, on February 
10, 2003, there was published declaration of the President V. Voronin on a new initiative – plan 
of a definitive settlement of the Transnistrian problem to the extent that a new Constitution of the 
country will be elaborated and passed jointly, given the lack of which “Moldova’s people cannot 
improve radically its life and restore its economy and social sphere”.  
 
“Socially oriented market economy” as a model for construction in Moldova was designed by the 
present Constitution, active since July 29, 1994. The Government, according to this guideline 
and in collaboration with the IMF and World Bank, at present finishes (deadline – March 2003) 
elaboration of the Strategy of economic growth and poverty reduction (PRSP). Such strategies 
are being realized in more than 40 poorest countries of the world; they serve as a road-map for 
those countries in realization of economic policy, while for international organizations they serve 
as a framework document for monitoring of situation in a given country.  
 
Therefore quality of the PRSP-Moldova will be evidence of the present Government 
professionalism, of its preferences regarding not only state dirigisme and intentions to liberalize 
economy, but its openness to collaboration with official structures, with the opposition and civil 
society as well.  
 
Prognosis of the Government for 2003 is quite optimistic: GDP growth – 6%, average wage 
growth – 20%, inflation – 6.0%, national currency exchange rate – 14,6 MDL for 1 USD, state 
budget deficit – 0.8% of GDP. International organizations are more discrete: they expect 4.0% 
GDP growth, further increase of external and internal debt and worsening of trade balance, 
assuming that sustainable economic growth can be achieved only through speeding up structural 
reforms and business barriers. Another emerging problem is “improvement of the country’s 
administrative-territorial system”. One can foresee that return from 10 to 33 smaller territorial 
units will not only cost more as regards management expenditures, but will also make work of 
the Government more difficult as regards both interaction with the new local administration and 
execution of the budget, relations with business environment, quality of statistics, etc.  
 
Under all these circumstances quality of governance will continue to be in 2003 the main 
concern for authorities, business and population. According to estimate of the President V. 
Voronin “the present structure of the executive power does not comply with objective 
programme tasks of the state” (session of the Parliament, 30.12.2002); “we need a well 
coordinated government team, experienced and vigorous” (session of the Government, 
17.02.2003). Indeed, if one takes a look at causes of slow and inconsequent reformation of the 
economy and periodic attempts to return to methods of administration, then they can be 
explained in many respects by unreformed state management machinery. It is worth paying 
attention to both excessive number of ministries, departments and agencies at the higher (central) 
level – more than 50 – and lack of a strong center of elaboration and coordination of economic 
policy. The Government does not act as a single team, but rather as a conglomeration of 
representatives of different group interests. This situation hampers quite effectively all attempts 
to liberalize Moldovan economy.  
 
It is recognized that formation of a new government is the best time for realization of deep 
changes in structure and functions of state machinery. If this takes place in 2003, then it is 
expedient to take into account experience of other European countries, including: distinct 
division of political posts in the Government (prime-minister, ministers and their deputies, 
councilors) from apolitical state service (all other posts); competitive selection of candidates for 
state posts; creation of necessary conditions (labor remuneration, education and skills 
improvement system) for the sake of stability of employment in the state service; ethical conduct 
code for officials.  
 
Instead of passing new normative acts, majority of these measures requires changing of those 
acts that already exist or can be realized within the framework of present authorities of the 
executive power.  
 
Economy: events & commentaries 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
In the last couple of weeks economic issues were the major concern of the country leadership, 
representatives of international monetary organizations, and economic media outlets. Judging 
from a multiple perspective, one may conclude that there are major risks at stake as far as 
economy is concerned, but there are opportunities as well. Let’s closely consider them.  
 
Two months of the year already elapsed, but it is still not clear whether the Government would 
secure much-awaited assistance from IMF and World Bank for its activities? The two 
representatives of the said institution (E. Ruggiero, C. Elbert) hosted one after another press 
conferences in February and both of them reconfirmed IMF and WB commitment to provide 
assistance to Moldova, on condition Moldovan authorities meet the requirements stipulated in 
the previously agreed structural reforms program and establish a favorable business environment 
in the country. Indeed the said requirement may not be fulfilled all at once, however donors are 
mainly concerned by the frequent “non-market” initiatives of the Government (like changing the 
laws, introducing subsidies for the agricultural sector, limiting the exports, thwarting 
privatization process, etc).  
 
Much-awaited IMF mission (M. Castello-Branco) would arrive in Chisinau only on March 13. 
However a mission of the WB (I. Hoffman) is currently in Moldova monitoring the elaboration 
of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. If positive $ 142 million might flow into the country for 
PRSP enforcement. Meanwhile, the state budget is highly volatile, especially as the salary 
payments are concerned. For instance the country’s major intellectual center – Academy of 
Science – received its last salary in December. In an attempt to resolve the problem, Ministry of 
Finance allocated 18,6 million Lei ($ 1,3 million USD) incurred from the sale of T-bills to 
commercial banks to cover the budget deficit for January – February.  
 
In the meantime, in February Ministry of Economy released its far-more optimistic 
macroeconomic forecasts for 2003: 7% GDP growth (initially forecasted 6%); 10% industrial 
growth; 9.6% exports growth; and 11% salary raise. Needless to say, agricultural growth has 
been surprisingly decreased from 5% to 2%. The decrease was probably determined by 
President’s negative evaluation of the “catastrophic” situation in the agriculture. Production 
cooperatives were recommended as a last-ditch method to recover the agriculture, by 
reorganizing and exempting them from taxes.  
 
In a related note, President Voronin indicated that the greatest achievement of the last two years 
was the industry recovery “privatization had lead to de-industrialization, whereas we have started 
to industrialize the country step-by-step, enterprise by enterprise, despite the lack of 
investments”. Indeed, after 1995 the great majority of industry, except for machinery 
construction, managed to adjust to the market economy, mainly due to the foreign investments 
(CMC-Knauf, Ciment-Rezina, Glass Company, Ionel, Balteanca, Floarea Soarelui, etc – a total 
of 80 enterprises). Currently, industry and services are the ones pooling stabilization of the 
economy.  
As energy accounts for one third of the foreign debt and for the considerable price of the 
production and services, the Government started a new round of negotiations with Gazprom on 
lowering the tariffs to $50 USD per 1000 m3 (currently $80 USD per 1000 m3). An agreement 
was reached that free-lance producers (ITERA from Kazakhstan) would deliver 1,300 million m3 
of gas at $61.5 USD per 1000 m3. Other initiatives: Ministry of Energy suggested developing a 
network of mini-power stations, as well as the intention of the „Danube-Balt-Trans” Russian-
Moldovan joint venture to build by April 1 a temporary wharf in Giurgiulesti, able to receive 
6,000-10,000 tones of petrol per month.  
 
As usual, Government agenda included the approval of numerous concepts and programs, such 
as: national policy in the field of aqua resources; renewal of heating system; road management, 
etc; as well as social issues, such as: obligatory medical insurance; payment of indemnities to the 
deposits in the Savings Bank; efficient administration of state housing, etc. Needless to say, there 
are some Government resolutions pointing to the poor enforcement of its decisions by state 
administration. An illustration of this is the failure to gather the income declarations from state 
officials in due term, the deadline being extended until July 1, 2003. Another example is the 
Decision on enforcing the Government Resolution “On fighting illegal passenger traffic no. 1054 
of 08.05.2002” (February 26, 2003) reading that the decision had not been enforced, 
consequently a new deadline for fighting embezzlement and corruption was set.  
 
Given President Voronin’s statement that Moldova’s economy would boom only if Transdnistria 
is reintegrated, a special consideration should be given to the activity of the recently established 
Ministry of Reintegration. The Ministry took part in the negotiations on Transdnistria under the 
auspices of OSCE (Tiraspol, February 27-28) and came up with several initiatives on 
establishing a Free Trade Zone “Nistru” with the support of Chinese investments. Meanwhile, 
Transdnistrian authorities set new customs tariffs on import and simplified the taxation from 10 
to 1 tax for small business (commencing April 1), practice which although debated for a long 
time in Moldova has not been implemented yet.  
 
Republic of Moldova has been in the spotlight of foreign media outlets as well. ”The Economist” 
(edited since 1843), a well known political and economic magazine, featured an article Europe’s 
failed state in its February 13 - 20 issue, presenting Moldova’s economic situation as quite 
gloomy, even recommending outside administration of its financial sector. Ministry of Finance 
commented on the article: “the writer’s findings are politically motivated, subjective and 
provocative, and were not supported by any realistic arguments”.  
 
It is worth mentioning that since mid-1990 The Economist published at least a dozen of articles 
on Moldova, with one of the first ones in March 1995 presenting the country as “laboratory of 
right reforms”. The articles to follow were more and more gloomy: “Nowhere land”, (June 
1999); “Can Moldova Get Worse?”, (July 2000); “The Land That Time Forgot”, (Sept 2000); 
“Cold Christmas in Moldova”, (Dec 2000); “A New Misery Curtain”, (June 2001); “The Future 
of Europe’s Must Dismal Country Looks Ever Bleaker”, (April 2002). Former Prime-Ministers 
Ion Sturza (1999) and Dumitru Braghis (2000) complained about such a bad coverage. The 
Economist published their comments under the Letters Column but stayed on its position. The 
negative outlook on Moldovan reforms has been even further enhanced by the “unreformed and 
unapologetic communists back to power”, but then what else might authorities expect from such 
a “bourgeois magazine”? Needless to say, Economist published its article on Moldova at the time 
another well-known magazine; BusinessWeek featured a “promotional article” about the 
Republic of Moldova presenting the situation in a more positive light (for further details see 
www.vegamedia.com).  
 
On the other hand, The Economist Intelligence Unit producing for more than half a century 
economic analysis and forecasts on over 200 countries, provides in its latest (35 pages) review on 
Moldova a more promising forecast: “real GDP growth should remain moderately strong in 
2003-2004” (for further details see www.store.ein.com). 
 
 
 
 
Financial challenges lying ahead of Moldova in 2003 
 
by Adrian Dumitriu 
 
 
Recently Ministry of Finance has confirmed some earlier forecasts on the financial challenges 
lying ahead of the Republic of Moldova in 2003, in particular budget enforcement. Although at 
the time 2003 budget had been worked out it was already clear that some problems would 
eventually surface, the Ministry preferred to neglect them and adopted a budget, which right 
from the beginning was labeled as a too optimistic, due to its virtual revenues forecasted from 
privatization, exaggerated foreign aid and high expectations as far as expenses are concerned. 
 
Ministry of Finance's report published in "Moldova Suverana" (governmental newspaper) 
highlights some contradictions: on the one hand it praises the effectiveness and cooperation in 
enforcing the budget, and on the other the very same effectiveness is blamed for the situation 
Republic of Moldova has found itself in, which in its turn determined Minister of Finance to alert 
on the financial challenges in 2003.  
 
Preliminary reports on the budget enforcement released by the Ministry of Finance for the first 
months of 2003 indicate an increase in the revenues to the state budget. It is worth mentioning 
that the reported increase is compared to the "same period of the last year". However, the latter 
was characterized by stagnation in foreign trade (both import and export). A number of importers 
from Moldova anticipated the introduction of pre-shipment inspection and imported huge 
amounts of goods in November - December 2001, whereas the normal trade resumed only in 
March - April 2002, when the inspection procedures became clear. This was also confirmed by 
the data released by the Customs Department reporting high revenues in January -February 2003 
as compared to the same period of 2002. Again increased foreign trade (both in value and in 
number of import - export transactions) accounts for the boosted Customs' revenues.  
 
There is another explanation for the increased revenues as compared to the same period of the 
last year, namely evolution of exchange rates vs. national currency. This refers in particular to 
the considerable fluctuations of Euro vs. MDL, some of the excises and customs taxes being 
calculated in Euro whereas levied in MDL. In early 2003 one Euro was around 16 MDL, 
whereas in the same period last year it was around 11 MDL.  
 
Even if domestic and foreign developments are favorable for levying higher revenues to the state 
budget in nominal terms, it is claimed that rather the boosting business accounts for it. Cases 
have been registered of fiscal administration by imposing businesses to make the payments to 
the state budget in advance or by means of the newly-established Center for Fighting Economic 
Crime and Corruption, which is persecuting even the businesses that comply with the law. It 
seems that domestic business, regardless of its field of activity, is confronted with more and 
more legal or other constraints raised by the state.  
 
To a large extent the enforcement of 2003 budget would depend on whether international 
monetary organizations would resume funding Republic of Moldova. Although troublesome, 
negotiations in this respect might bring 10 million USD from the World Bank and 15 million 
from the EU. This would enable the country to service its foreign debt. Further, if foreign aid is 
not resumed it might impact financial markets, interest rates, fluctuations on exchange market 
and inflation rate in 2003. It seems that the seasonal character of national currency depreciation 
is taking a longer period, while resumed external funding would reduce its further depreciation.  
 
Furthermore, if the foreign funding is not resumed, the temptation to directly borrow from the 
National Bank of Moldova would be much higher, although neither the Law on the State Budget 
for 2003, nor monetary policy provide for such borrowing in 2003. Inflation pressure has 
become too obvious in the first months of 2003.  
 
Debates on economic, customs, currency and other kind of unions have been recurring both 
domestically and abroad lately. I would like to dwell on the customs union by pointing that the 
stability of national currency relies on a number of economic as well as psychological 
(behavioral) factors. That is, any doubt in the future of the Moldovan Lei (including whether it 
would be still in use) may lead to some negative outcomes, like depreciation of the Lei (although 
there would be no economic grounds for such depreciation). A clear message from the 
authorities, including the monetary ones, anticipating (rather than mere ascertaining) the 
developments, should calm the spirits to a certain extent.  
 
Year 2003 may be by all means characterized as tough from financial point of view. The last 
ditches on a short term are foreign creditors. However, they would not guarantee stability in the 
long run. Worsening business environment and foreign debt burden would continue to 
destabilize Republic of Moldova economic policy as long as there would be confused, 
contradicting and chaotic messages and initiatives in the field of economy. 
 
 
 
Social orientation: no strategy yet? 
 
by Stefan Zgama 
 
 
Since the beginning of 2003 two additional factors have drawn increased attention to social 
issues, which the Government has constantly declared as its priority. Firstly, elaboration of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (for which the country wishes to receive World Bank and IMF 
credits). Secondly, necessity of a "bigger care for people" on the eve of local elections. That is 
why, at least half of the 400 Government decisions adopted in January - March were on social 
issues.  
 
In this respect, emphasis has been placed upon strengthening state regulation in the field of 
employment, wages and social security. Thus, beginning with April 2003, the pensions of 
658,000 pensioners will be raised by 18%. The Government passed this decision given the 
increase of the minimal wage, which in its turn should secure higher revenues to the state social 
insurance fund.  
 
In March, the National Employment Program for 2003 - 2005 was finally approved. The 
situation of the labor market in the country is quite worrisome. The decrease in the population 
number registered since mid 90' has been intensified in the recent years by the decreasing 
number of population able to work (ranging 18 - 62 years of age), in the IV quarter of 2002 they 
accounted for 1,579,000. According to statistics the latter reside mainly in rural areas, where 
60% of the unemployed live. Resumed economic growth (in GDP terms!) had no impact so far 
on the employment: 1,688,000 in 1993 and 1,505,000 in 2002 (a 10.8% reduction). Under the 
methodology of the International Labor Organization, there were 110,000 unemployed and the 
unemployment rate was 6.8%. Youth, including those with higher education, accounts for the 
great majority of this figure. Half of those who went abroad in search for a job are younger than 
30. The National Employment Plan provides that 70 "actions" would be organized to create new 
workplaces, to facilitate employment, to aid youth in finding jobs, to conduct professional 
training, to organize public works and to ensure social protection of the unemployed. The goal is 
to reduce the unemployment rate to 6.0 - 6.1% by 2005.  
 
Government decided that the time has come to increase the monthly wage rate for the lowest 
(first) qualification rank workers in self-financing enterprises from 250 to 300 MDL. And since 
June 1 it will be raised for the second time - up to 340 MDL.  
 
Gradual increase of the minimal wage sounds encouraging. However, a guideline, instead of 
inflation rate, should be rather considered adjustment of the minimal wage to the cost of living 
(in the IV quarter of 2002 - 521.7 MDL). So far, the ratio is 0.5:1.0. It is worth mentioning that 
the minimal wage of the public employee is currently 100 MDL, or 19.2% of the cost of living. 
Public employees' wage has been a constant headache for the Government. In 2002 monthly 
wage in education was 464.2 MDL, or 67.1% of the average salary per country, in health-care 
and social services 463.3 MDL or 63%. The Government recommended raising the wage in the 
budget-financed sphere by 15-20%, however trade unions believe it is not enough. The 
Government declared it would raise the wage despite the fact that its arrears in paying wages to 
the budgetary sphere exceed 170 million MDL (approximately 12 million USD).  
 
Republic of Moldova is considered to be one of the poorest countries in Europe. So who are 
poor, where do they reside, and what stratum is the most affected by poverty? According to the 
"Report on Poverty" developed by the Poverty Monitoring Unit of the Ministry of Economy 
poverty rate has been estimated at 22.8%, based on the relative poverty line - 50% of the average 
household consumption, i.e. every forth Moldovan may consider himself to be relatively poor. 
This conclusion has been made based on examination of 6,400 household budget surveys (2002).  
 
Poverty level is a little higher in the South of Moldova, where agriculture and small towns are 
predominant. In general, residence in rural areas is a factor increasing the risk of poverty 
(poverty rate is higher in villages than in cities). As for small towns, unemployment is stagnant 
there, many "old" factories are not working and there are no investments to create new work 
places.  
 
It is interesting that in contrast to many countries, in Moldova the poverty is lower in households 
lead by women than in those lead by men. At the same time it was pointed out that the younger 
the women are, the lower is the risk for the household to become poor.  
 
In general, the young age of the household head, which is considered to be a risk factor in other 
countries, is not valid for Moldova. Moreover, the poverty among the households lead by young 
people, up to 30 years of age, is lower as compared to other families and represents 72.1% of the 
average level. The reason for this is the fact that traditionally young families benefit of material 
support from their parents and relatives, which enables them to enjoy better living standards 
especially until they have children.  
 
The Government should pay attention to the fact that poverty in families increases with the 
number of children. The poverty rate in families with three children is 1.4 times higher than in 
families with one child, whereas in families with four or more children 2.1 times higher. 
Children up to five are in a particularly difficult situation. An extremely worrying fact is 
malnutrition in families with many children. Another risk category consists of retired people. 
Level of their poverty increases along with their age advancement.  
 
Education - a good legacy of socialism - reduces the risk of poverty. People with higher 
education are 2.3 times less subject to poverty risk than the rest. Unfortunately, education has 
become lately a privilege of well-off families. Average per capita spending on education in poor 
families is 10.5 times less (!) than in prosperous ones. This is also valid for health-care: in poor 
families those expenses are 9.7 times less than in well-off families.  
 
As we can see, poverty is many-sided in Moldova. But the country both lacked strategy on 
poverty reduction in the past and still lacks it. It has been two years now since various 
committees and projects are working, seminars and meetings are held. Nevertheless, there still is 
no integral vision of the problem and ways of its solution, which IMF/World Bank missions have 
noted with regret and left Moldova without seeing any Poverty Reduction Strategy that the 
Government promised to deliver by March 31. 
 
Two years later... 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
On 19 April 2001, the Parliament of Moldova gave its vote of confidence to the Government 
Activity Programme, and the President approved its composition through his decree. The Prime 
Minister in his turn announced an intention to implement a plan of emergency measures 
“Fulger” (“Lightning”) for the first 100 days…  
 
Two years have passed. The Cabinet, in an anticipatory effort, adopted on 3 March 2003 the 
Decision «On fulfilment of the Government Activity Programme «Revival of Economy – 
Revival of the Country», the results of the socio-economic development of the country in 2002 
and of the urgent measures and tasks taken to enhance effectiveness of the public administration 
bodies», which reads that «in 2001-2002 high rates of economic growth have been achieved and 
the living standards have increased significantly». Further on, the paper demonstrates data on 
growth of the GDP, production and services, low inflation, growth of wages and pensions. It 
especially mentions that the Cabinet “succeeded in avoiding a default” and expresses particular 
gratitude to one of agencies – Fitch Ratings – for upgrading Moldova's rating as regards long-
term financial engagements from DD (risk of default) to B- and hence slightly improving it. Yet, 
even the new rating is still below the one Moldova had in the complicated 1998 during the 
regional (Russian) financial crisis.  
 
Still further on, «at the same time, analysis of the socio-economic situation has revealed certain 
reserves in functioning of the central and local public administration bodies, as well as a certain 
delay in execution of the Government Activity Programme». But the only thing mentioned 
specifically refers to the under-collection of taxes into the state budget. 
 
The Cabinet decided: «1) to take account of the course of carrying out the Government Activity 
Programme … and the results achieved in 2002, 2) to approve the Action Plan for increasing the 
effectiveness of the activity of public administration bodies and the Action Plan on execution of 
the 2003 budget». The former plan includes 55 items and is made up based on proposals of 
ministries and departments, whereas the latter plan includes 44 items and is the produce of the 
Ministry of Finance. Controls are to be undertaken on a quarterly basis, by 15th of each next 
month. 
 
The top priorities (term of execution was due 31 March 2003) as follows: «developing the 
Strategy of the Public Sector Reform» and «developing the final draft of the Strategy of 
Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction». The term expired; the controls are over; the 
paperwork… is still being drafted. 
 
This far from univocal Cabinet paper mirrored the style the Government works: optimism with 
no long-term priorities, attention to the form and quick reaction with negligence of deeper 
processes going on in the economic and social spheres.  
Administrative and to a large extent populist Government actions have created in 2001-2002 a 
phantom positive result, which, on the surface, showed in form of GDP growth and higher 
expenditures for social needs, including those for education and social assistance. Yet, 
cumulatively the Moldovan economy has been showing signs of imminent danger. They become 
apparent both through the alarming amount of the state debt, both foreign and domestic, and 
through the acute shortage of investments, slow process of creating new jobs, mass labour 
migration of the most active part of the Moldovan able population abroad, the misbalance 
between the domestic demand and supply (hence the increase in imports), weakening of the role 
of exports as an engine of economic growth, the increasing trade balance deficit of the country. 
 
It is not only wrong to overlook the existing limitations of economic growth, but potentially 
dangerous for the future of the country. Of course both the Government and the people are hectic 
about the 16% GDP growth registered over the past three years. For the sake of the truth, one 
should bear in mind that value of the Moldovan GDP in 2002 amounting to 22.04 billion MDL 
(US$1.62 billion) is 19% or one fifth lower the GDP in 1997, while Moldovan exports in 2002 
worth US$666 million were US$224 million below the values of exports in 1997. Apart from 
that, a closer look at the structure of the GDP and its increment reveals that the input of the 
production sector (industry, agriculture) is rather modest. According to the Ministry of 
Economics’ data, out of the 7.2% GDP growth in 2002, the growth of the added value of the 
industry and agriculture accounts for 1.6% and 0.9% correspondingly as compared to the 2.6% in 
services and 2.1% on taxes on goods and imports. As we can see, unfortunately no quality 
change has occurred in the Moldovan economic growth yet. On the other hand, it is impossible to 
change the structure of growth over two-three years as it requires structural reforms and more 
time. 
 
In the meantime, the Government has not resolved on the main thing yet, namely how can the 
entrepreneurial and investment climate be improved? How can the inertia of the state 
administration be fought? What our practical steps as a future close neighbour of the enlarging 
European Union should be?  
 
One has to admit frankly that in 2001-2002 due to well-known reasons (regardless of the 
pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) have not prompted any 
constructive changes to the economic policy. Laws have been amended, initiatives to enhance 
the state regulation methods in the production sphere and proposals for social measures to the 
extent allowed by the limited resources of the state budget have been launched. However, there 
has been a clear slowing down of utterly important and at times politically difficult structural 
reforms. Improvement of the business environment failed, as well as overcoming of the distance 
between banks and the real sector and reducing shadow economy did. In addition, clumsy 
administration has worsened relations with foreign investors and international financial 
organizations.  
 
Since the conventional reserves for economic growth in the country have been exhausted, as 
President V. Voronin also once admitted, it is not necessary to come forward just with optimistic 
forecasts, but rather to establish the priorities of economic policy and well coordinated practical 
To do that one needs political will, stability in the country and in the Government itself. 
Unfortunately, there remained in its current composition only a small part, only 7 out of 17, of 
those who were called to the Government two years ago. In a series of ministries and 
departments the leadership have changed three times over the past twenty-four months. Is the 
Cabinet a single team indeed? 
 
 
 
 
Moldova's agriculture: crisis or rehabilitation? 
 
by Alexandr Muravschi 
 
 
Moldova's agriculture has demonstrated certain success during the last two years. After a decade 
of decline one can observe for the first time growth in agricultural production. It is also 
important that in 2002 there was growth in the livestock products. With the account of the 
developing tendencies, the Ministry of Agriculture projects a 10% growth in the agricultural 
goods production volume in 2003. At the same time, on the initiative of the same Ministry, the 
Government accepted on March 31 a special Resolution on the situation existing in the agrarian 
sector of the Republic and the measures to be taken in order to do the 2003 agricultural spring 
works within optimal time. Mass media reveals more and more materials about a critical if not 
catastrophic situation in the agrarian sector. This leads to the conclusion that our agriculture has 
not yet developed any resistance to weather contingencies and the slightest changes of the latter 
cause considerable positive and negative differences in the production volume. But can this go 
on forever? Every year Moldova experiences a heavy hail, spring frosts or drought. These 
phenomena often serve as a justification for the governing bodies in their failures. However, 
developed countries' experience shows that it is possible to resist nature knowing how to use the 
agrarian's economic leverage. Can Moldova create such mechanisms? 
 
In order to answer this question, we should shed light on the main factors that have brought 
about the production growth during the last two years and focus on their further intensification. 
For the time being, they are not so numerous, which simplifies the analysis. It is true that no 
serious change has taken place in the policy of the current Government as compared to that of 
the predecessors. The fiscal policy in agriculture has remained practically unchanged. The 
subsidies did not grow. No collectivization happened. Only the administrative pressure on 
economic entities has grown, some export restricting steps have been taken, while the number of 
the meetings held has increased. Thus, the Resolution mentioned above emphasizes the need for 
teleconferences, discussions, meetings and so on. But all this has rather a negative than positive 
impact on the agricultural development.  
 
The growth results from the following factors:  
 
 overall economic growth of Moldova's products major consumers, i.e. Russia, the 
Ukraine and Romania, which increased the volume of its agricultural export to these 
countries and consequently resulted in the production growth;  
 private sector in agriculture has practically finalized its stage of formation and entered the 
stage of adaptation to the market conditions. This is the reason for the Republic's quick 
recovery after the crashing regional financial crisis of 1998-1999;  
 performance of the projects created with donors' financial support in order to create 
market infrastructure in agriculture (farm stores, business cooperatives, machinery and 
technological centers);  
 grown increase of financial resources in agriculture coming both through commercial 
bank system and through alternative sources (Savings and Credit Associations, 
Microfinance Alliance, etc.);  
 private (privatized and newly created) processing enterprises started more actively 
creating their own raw materials source and support farmers.  
 
All this means that Moldavian agriculture has overcome its most difficult period and started 
recovering. However, a lot is still to be done for the success to be strengthened. 
 
First of all, owners should be given the right for choosing the ownership form and type of 
economic activities. In this context, the growing pressure of authorities on peasants and their 
leaders aimed at the rehabilitation of the collective sector disguised as creation of production 
cooperatives is difficult to understand. No other country sets the goal of creation of production 
organization forms as a matter of paramount importance in its agrarian policy. All types of 
enterprises appear as a result of owners' interests and aspirations. This is the reason why 
production cooperatives cannot practically be found in the developed countries' agriculture 
because in them an owner loses its individuality and a de-facto ownership rights. The production 
cooperatives that our collectivization advocates are so fond of speaking have nothing in common 
with farmer cooperatives in the West. The major purpose of the first stage in the agrarian reform 
was to form a class of owners able to independently take decisions on the ways of their 
development. This class is coming into being in agriculture and needs to be supported.  
 
Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen the efficiency of the economic mechanisms stimulating 
agricultural land consolidation and concentration in the hands of the most effective users. For 
this purpose, it is necessary to maximally simplify the land sale/purchase procedures and adopt a 
law on lease that would strengthen the lessees' rights. It is necessary to study Hungary's 
experience on the payment of special compensations to the pensioners having decided to sell 
their land.  
 
Thirdly, it is necessary to ensure the influx of funds in agriculture. At the same time, it is 
necessary to take into account that agriculture by itself is not very attractive for investments, 
which is true not only for Moldova. The major flow of agricultural investments may come only 
through the processing industry. For this reason, it is necessary to quickly finish privatization of 
the remaining wineries and tobacco factories including the Chisinau tobacco factory and to 
ensure full guarantees for the investors' normal work regardless of the political leadership 
changes. 
 
Fourthly, the Government and the Ministry of Agriculture should specifically focus on 
improving the export regime. At the same time, the possibilities that Moldova obtained in the 
context of its joining the WTO should be used to the maximum including settlement of disputes 
caused by some restrictions imposed by the EU countries.  
 
Fifthly, with the account of Moldova's limited possibilities in the state subsidizing of agriculture, 
the subsidies should be concentrated in the most perspective directions. The losses caused by 
hail, downpours, etc. should be compensated mainly from the agricultural production risk 
insurance system. 
 
Sixthly, the work on the agricultural sector's infrastructure should be continued, i.e. networks of 
veterinary centers, artificial insemination centers, wholesale markets, agricultural machinery 
repair and maintenance centers should be created. 
 
The dependence of Moldova's economy on the whims of nature will decrease and the Republic's 
agriculture will become competitive on the world markets, while the villagers' income will grow 
only provided that all the measures mentioned above are observed along with the macro-
economic stability preserved and other industries of economy and primarily the non-agrarian 
sector in the rural areas developed.  
 
 
 
 
Raions and economy 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
So, local elections are over. And now workaday routine activities begin – practical developing 32 
new (old!) raions and debugging their administration. It lies ahead to get back buildings 
(majority of which are leased out or privatized), fill them with personnel; arrange 
communications, statistics, etc. A particular problem is employment, which requires measures of 
supporting entrepreneurship and initiative people. Pre-election political rhetoric is gradually 
fading and the main thing is being brought to the forefront – what good will return from judetses 
to raions bring to population and economy, which is – as well known – primary.  
 
Territorial administration is not an easy task. Countries of Europe (that is called “Europe of 
regions”) accumulated vast experience in this regard – in legislation, division of budgets, using 
funds for employment promotion, infrastructure reconstruction and environment improvement.  
 
We, who live in the Republic of Moldova, are still to overpass this way. Situation is being 
aggravated by that since the very beginning and further, over fifty years the republic (MSSR) 
was guided by the branch-like principle of planning, allocation of resources and administration 
under multiple (no less than 10 times!) reshaping of its administrative and territorial division. 
After 1991, when omnipotent Gosplan and branch ministries faded, territories still got neither 
rights nor real economic basis in form of municipal property or sufficient local budget revenues.  
 
Orienting itself at European standards of local self-government, Moldova’s Parliament ratified 
during 1997-1998 the European chart of local self-government and through introduction of 
judetses consolidated the country’s administrative and territorial division. It was hoped that there 
would be benefits from potential of larger regions. Later on, though followed changes rather 
formal than essential. Besides, due to sharp expansion of state apparatus of the higher, national 
level, it has also happened at the local one.  
 
Despite transition to the market economy, local authorities did not find any specific stimuli for 
entrepreneurship development (except for personal participation). Indicators of this drama areas 
follows: 68% of enterprises and 57% of financial assets turnover of SME are registered in the 
Chisinau municipality – closer to the Parliament and Government, tax and customs departments, 
licensing chamber, etc.  
 
What is to wait for now, given the return to raions? The Government recalling its promise to cut 
down expenditures approved on June 10, 2003 structure and personnel of raion, municipality and 
community administrations so far. At that, as the Prime-Minister said “in order to increase their 
efficiency we will also resort to dismissal, but it will be done under the legislation”. Let us hope 
that more essential changes in rights and functions of local administration will follow, first of all 
as regards local socio-economic development.  
 
Otherwise we will not avoid another wave of “consolidation-fragmentation“, as it has already 
happened in the past. Indeed, history teaches that it teaches us nothing:  
 
 May 1948: the second session of the Supreme Soviet of the MSSR abolished judetses and 
established 60 raions on the republic’s territory; 
 The 50s: number of raions decreased, at first down to 46 (1950) and later – to 35 (1959). 
At the same time, it was considered expedient to unite raions into 4 circuits (Baltsi, 
Chisinau, Tiraspol and Cahul). By the way, the present building of the Academy of 
Sciences of the Republic of Moldova was meant for the circuit administration; 
 1963: instead of large circuits, though, at the time of permanent reorganizations of N. 
Khrushchev there took place abrupt consolidation of raions and decrease of their number 
to 18; 
 but, in the next year already a new wave of fragmentation followed: 1964 – 26, 1996 – 
31, 1972 33 and 40 raions in the 80s; 
 1990: Supreme Soviet of the SSR of Moldova, based on Declaration of sovereignty, 
approved Statute on improvement of the country’s administrative and territorial division 
and charged the Committee on issues of local self-government “present proposals” 
starting from necessity to have territorial units (judetses, traditional for Bessarabia) with 
capacious demographic potential and capable financial and economic basis; the Planning 
research institute substantiated to the Government four variants: 7, 9, 12 or 18 judetses 
(and seven years later one of them served as the basis); 
 1998: restoration of judetses (10 units), plus ATU Gagauzia; Transnistria has kept 5 
raions; 
 2003: return to raions (32), plus ATU Gagauzia (3 internal raions) and 5 raions in 
Transnistria. 
 In soviet times, postulate on “unity of political and economic raion administration, which 
is a junction point where directives of the party and Soviet power are executed” (CPSU in 
resolutions and decisions of congresses and conferences, volume 4, p. 234) served as an 
ideological consecration of “consolidations-fragmentations. When raions were 
consolidated, it was meant to “cut down state apparatus expenditures” and when they 
were fragmented – “to bring authority closer to the people”. During 2001-2002 the 
authorities while substantiating refusal from judetses and return to more fragmented 
raions produced both (!) these arguments!  
 
It is desirable that it will be that way. But it can be only achieved through refusal from strict 
centralization and administration, while developing municipalities and raions as self-governing 
economic communities, susceptible to entrepreneurial initiative and social innovations.  
 
Small potential of each of 40 new/old raions (including Transnistria and Gagauzia) can be 
compensated – ad exemplum of Poland, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria – through 
exarticulation of 4-5 “regions of development” (North, Center, Southeast, South and Chisinau 
municipality) on the country’s territory, which economic peculiarities, transport benefits, 
demographic and industrial potential would allow realization – within the concrete strategy for 
each programmed region – of large projects of national importance, including with attraction of 
credits, investments and technical aid both from the CIS countries and European Union.  
 
Stable – for the nearest 10-15 years – combination of economic and administrative division into 
raions of the country can let us avoid new forcible decisions on number, composition and 
boundaries of raions, and functions of local development administration will gain a real 
economic basis and specific social environment. 
 
 
 
 
The customs' stamps drama. Second act. 
 
by Galina Selari 
 
 
It seems that intensity in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol has become stronger once 
more, and again because of the export – import transactions control. It is understandable, if we 
take into consideration the extreme dependence of small open economy of Transnistria (the same 
as Moldova’s one) on external trade. Since the middle of 90-s, as it is well known, the external 
trade of TMR was realized under the “cover” of customs stamps of the Republic of Moldova, 
resulted in USD 817.7 million external trade turnover in 2000 or per capita 3 time higher as 
compared to Moldova.  
 
The Republic of Moldova introduced new customs procedures and revoked stamps after its 
joining to the WTO (May 2001), consequences of these for Transnistrian economy were 
extremely unfavorable, including reducing exports by 36% and import by 17% in 2002. The 
Transnistrian Administration has considered this fact as “an economic blockage” which resulted, 
according to their own estimations, in USD 170 million losses.  
 
The idea of a federative state proposed by OSCE so unexpectedly at the end of 2002 was backed 
up by both parties and raised new hopes, including those for economic cooperation as well. The 
advantages of joint appearance at world markets, investors attracting, and participation in 
regional projects for South-East Europe were absolutely evident.  
 
Mr. Vladimir Voronin, initiating the elaboration of the new Constitution of the Republic of 
Moldova (February 2003) pointed out that “the people of Moldovan won’t be able to improve 
their life drastically only until two armies, two customs and two banking systems exist”.  
 
And now the situation has become aggravated anew. The ground was the Moldovan-Ukrainian 
Protocol on May 15, 2003 according to which goods can be transported through the customs 
points on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border including Transnistrian only on the basis of the 
waybills, commercial and customs documents of the official Chisinau. The last action was 
followed by invitation to registration of Transnistrian enterprises in State Registration Chamber 
and receiving certificates of origin in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Republic of 
Moldova.  
 
Mr. Igor Smirnov in his Appeal to the people of Transnistria (June 30, 2003) considered these as 
“new cases of blockage of external economic activities of Transnistrian enterprises”. He also 
mentioned that “categorical requirement to register our enterprises is related with Moldovan 
official’s desire to control privatization process. And in the near future they will ask for 
payments of all taxes to Moldovan budget, in order to bereave the Transnistrian population of its 
economic basis”.  
 
Leaving policy aside, we will try to clarify these two violently discoursed problems, namely 
providing Transnistrian goods and cargoes intended for export with Moldovan customs stamps 
and validity of privatization processes in TMR.  
 
Creation of customs points on Ukrainian-Moldovan border. Both for Moldova and Ukraine as 
future EU neighbors economical practicability of operational customs border is evident because 
it leads to cutback of “shadow” export-import flows, suspension of smuggling, illegal migration, 
etc.  
 
In May 2001 the Protocol on Harmonization of Tax and Customs Legislation was already signed 
by Moldova and Transnistria, according to which the regulation of export-import transactions is 
based on “tax and customs legislation considering both requirements of World Trade 
Organization and World Customs Organization and CIS and European countries legislation”[1]. 
The joint customs control on Ukrainian-Moldovan border should be established beginning 
September1, 2001.[2]  
 
Moldovan tax and customs legislation in force, in the whole, corresponds with the international 
requirements and norms, and this fact is recognized by the Transnistrian Administration. 
Therefore the use of Moldovan legislation requirements for issuing customs documentation fully 
satisfies the Protocol’s provisions. The decision of the question was delayed for two years, but 
even now the Transnistrian authorities consider the joint customs points as “economic blockage” 
on the side of Moldova. But why only on the side of Moldova, why not on the side of both 
Moldova and Ukraine?  
 
The negative attitude of the Administration of TMR to the regulation of customs rules for all 
economic agents could be explained by the lack of credit to the official Chisinau in terms of the 
letter’s unwillingness to consistently carry out its obligations. We can mention that the Moscow 
Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and 
Transnistria states that Transnistria has the right to independently establish and maintain 
international contacts in the fields of economy, science and technology, and culture, and thus is 
considered an independent economic agent. The offered temporary registration in Moldova of 
economic agents from the eastern region and maintenance of their ties with the budget of TMR 
are far from guaranteeing that this system of relationships with regional budget will be kept after 
the permanent registration (January 1, 2004).  
 
Constructive solution of inter-budget relations problem by the parties, assumption of the related 
mutual obligations and, what is the most important, their efficient fulfillment could create a basis 
for the solution of other important economic problems, such as unification of requirements of 
enterprises registration, avoidance of double income taxation, and some others. Under such 
approach the creation and management of the common register of economic agents would turn 
from the “stumbling block” into the “corner stone” of a single economic system. So far the 
parties have preferred to use the language of statements and declarations  
 
A few words on the legitimacy of the privatization of enterprises. Transnistria demanded (July 
3, 2003) that Moldova recognize privatization in the region legitimate as a condition for its 
further participation in the joint Constitutional Commission. Therefore an Act on Ownership is to 
be signed, “which will legally guarantee the absence of pretensions of Chisinau to Transnistrian 
ownership”.  
 
Let us turn to the existing agreements. The Protocol on Guarantees for Attraction and Protection 
of Foreign Investments and Cooperation in the Field of Investments Activity says, “the activity 
of foreign investors and entrepreneurs on the territory of Transnistria is guaranteed by the laws 
of the Republic of Moldova, Transnistria and international laws”.[3] By this, as we can see, the 
right of the Transnistrian Administration to carry out privatization basing on their own 
legislation in force is recognized. It is especially important that the Protocol stipulates the 
elaboration of the joint project of investment strategy, but actual work on realization of such a 
vital for both parties decision has not yet been started. What a pity! 
 
Today official Chisinau supports legal (?) privatization, at the same time speaking about 
probable consequences for the investors who have already privatized some property in 
Transnistria the Prime-Minister of Moldova doesn’t exclude that some problems may arise if the 
buyers had not consulted the Moldovan authorities beforehand.[4] What is not quit clear here is 
what kind of investors may face with the problems: local (from Transnistria) and/ or foreign 
ones. And what about the guarantees mentioned in the bilateral Protocol?  
Duplicity and inconsistency of official Chisinau’s statements on such an important question can 
do nothing but alarm not only Tiraspol but also potential investors intending to realize their 
projects on both banks of the Dniester.  
 
It should be mentioned that “TirPa”, the first enterprise with foreign (Italian) capital was 
registered in Transnistria as far back as 1988. Besides, «Itera International Eenergy Group 
L.L.G.» registered in the State of New-Jersey (USA) is a co owner of the Moldavian Steel Works 
in Ribnita (MMZ) the main financial donor to the region. Moreover, this company is interested 
in investment projects in Moldova as well. The latest example is the privatization of “Buket 
Moldavii” winery in Dubosari. On the request of the Ministry of Economy of Transnistria the 
pre-sale assessment was done by an audit company from Chisinau. The tender was won by 
“Aroma” Trade House, a Russian investor that already owns some companies in Moldova.  
 
Common sense and economic interest as we see, have already lead to the bilateral agreements 
mutual realization of which opens the horizons of creative development as opposed to economic 
confrontation.  
 
The time calls for the negotiation, not for exchange of declarations in “strong language”. No 
political compromise can be reached without agreement in the field of economy. That is why 
now, since it hasn’t been done before, specialists in the different fields of law and economy 
should joint their efforts aiming at approximation of tax, banking and trade legislation, standards, 
social security system. We have to go this complex way and it will be shorter if we go towards 
each other.  
 
 
 
[1] Protocol on Harmonization of Tax and Customs Legislation, 16.05.2001, Tiraspol 
[2] Protocol on Harmonization of Tax and Customs Legislation, 16.05.2001, Tiraspol 
[3] Protocol on Guarantees for Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investments and Cooperation 
in the Field of Investments Activity, 16.05.2001, Tiraspol 
[4] There are no reasons for confrontation, Nezavisimaia Moldova, 02.07.2003 
 
 
 
 
Export promotion: on paper 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
Under IMF's trade restrictions classification scheme Moldova’s regime is rated “1” – the most 
liberal category. This is what is called “trade on paper”. But in Moldova there is also “trade in 
practice” that state hampers through its ministries, departments and agencies creating multiple 
barriers and traps – officially and unofficially in order to feed the corruption. And this has to be 
fought somehow. And the Government does that… on paper.  
Recently, a grateful domestic producer discovered the following document in the “Monitorul 
Oficial al Republicii Moldova”, #141-145 of July 11, 2003:  
 
Dsposition #72-d, July 7, 2003  
 
Achieving sustainable economic growth depends on the existence of a business environment that 
ensures that no informal barriers to the exporting economic agents exist. In order to achieve this 
objective as well as with a view to the most efficient implementation of the Government 
Decision No. 478, as of April 22, 2003 „As regards the exclusion of barriers to exports” all 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies will do their utmost to facilitate exports and ensure all 
necessary support to exporting economic agents. The above-mentioned institutions and their 
employees will use as guideline in their activity the fact that the decision whether or not to 
export, at what price, through which marketing channels, and whether or not to use the 
Commodity Exchange to purchase the goods to be exported, is entirely up to each economic 
agent. 
 
Prime-Minister of the Republic of Moldova 
 
This masterpiece of the State Chancellery shows that even after 12 years of transition to market 
economy, when more than 85% of GDP is formed by the private sector, not all employees of 
ministries, departments and agencies realize that “decision on export, price and its method” does 
not belong to them, but to economic units! What did the previous decision of the Government 
stipulate in this regard? Quote:  
 
Government decision #478, April 22, 2003 
 
On elimination of obstacles to export of commodities  
 
With a view to achieve sustainable economic growth, facilitate export of domestic products 
through creation of favorable conditions for economic units, eliminate all technical obstacles to 
export, as well as to introduce some new restrictions of this kind, the Government decides: 
 
1. Ministries and departments are prohibited to set any restrictions through departmental 
normative acts, inquiry of additional documents, besides those determined by normative 
acts regulating external trade, and establishment of indicative prices for export and other 
actions making export activity of domestic economic units more difficult. 
2. Central public administration bodies are to: 
 revise departmental normative acts to bring them into accordance with 
requirements of the first paragraph of this decision and inform the Government 
about the actions made in 30 days; 
 publish internal normative acts in the Monitorul Oficial imperatively that affect 
negatively or regulate external trade regime, after preliminary coordination with 
the Ministry of Justice. 
3. Ministry of Economy is entrusted with control over execution of the given decision. 
Prime-Minister of the Republic of Moldova  
So, the Government issued two decisions (identical by implication) on the same problem – 
overcoming bureaucratic barriers to export. These decisions, unfortunately, are not executed at 
all. Let us remember that not long ago, the Government approved Strategy for export promotion 
in 2002-2005 (Decision of the Government #80 of January 29, 2002). Its goal was to “enliven 
export and increase confidence of exporters to the policy of the state”.  
And even still earlier (April 2001), there was Programme of the Government that stated 
emotionally and clearly that export is the Moldovan economy’s driving force, the main source of 
budget incomes providing for payment under external debt and so on. However, all this exists 
only on paper…  
 
The realities are that despite export has been growing over the last three years, its volume in 
2002 was only 666 mil USD – still 25.2% less than in 1997, and trade balance deficit (import 
exceeding export ) accounted for 414,2 mil USD. Structure and geography of our export have 
been changing slowly. Agriculture, food processing and textile products account for more than a 
half of the total export. Traditionally, due to the bilateral free trade agreement, Russia and other 
CIS countries remain to be main importers of Moldovan products.  
 
Despite better terms of trade with the EU (in comparison to those with the CIS) Moldova’s 
turnover with this region is still modest. Thus, if share of the EU and CEE in Moldovan export 
was 21.2% in 1997, in 2002 it accounted for 37.8%; as regards import – 38.6% and 49.5% 
respectively. Growth of import to Moldova of European goods is preconditioned by the 
consumption growth. Return growth of export, though, is hindered by both low competitiveness 
of the Moldovan industry and large food and textile components of Moldovan export, which 
come up against the EU protectionism in these sectors.  
 
Obstacles that state bureaucracy creates to export are multiple and diverse. In opinion of Ion 
Mushuc, the president of the “Timpul” business club, “image of entrepreneurs as enemies is 
being propagated in the society and, as a result, business activity decreases, business retreats into 
the shadow, many entrepreneurs begin to fear for the future of their business and the country”. 
The “Timpul” club came out on July 15 of this year with an appeal to the President V. Voronin: 
entrepreneurs suggest the President to express his own attitude towards arbitrariness of the 
bureaucracy to legal business, create a permanent committee for protection of entrepreneurship 
within the Parliament, amend the Law on the Center for Fighting Economic Crimes hence 
bringing it into accordance with the Constitution of the country and international legal norms.  
 
It was July as well when the IMF resident representative, Edgardo Ruggiero, reminded that the 
IMF Executive Board will not release external financing to our country unless Moldova cancels 
export restrictions and restores pre-shipment inspection.  
 
Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe has been also caring for promotion of our export. 
The other day, it approved resolution “On economic development of Moldova: plans and 
perspectives” that recommends the country’s leadership to stimulate entrepreneurship, remove 
all export restrictions, implement informational technologies more widely in customs, tax 
administration, financial service and develop trade infrastructure – standardization and testing 
systems, marketing, transport services and communications.  
Thus, we are urged to practical actions to promote the export. This applies both to a more active 
utilization of Moldova’s accession to the WTO, Stability Pact and Free Trade Area and 
elimination of formal and informal trade barriers within the country. As for the Government 
decisions “on elimination of obstacles to export’, such decisions are necessary of course, but they 
have to be executed in stead of being multiple cloned. 
 
 
 
 
Shadow economy as a driving force 
 
by Ion Olan 
 
 
Recently, Department of Statistics and Sociology announced that share of shadow economy (SE) 
in Moldova is 31.6% to GDP, according to the “Measuring unobserved economy” methodology 
recommended by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, Paris). 
Meanwhile, our statistics has been claiming this indicator to be no more than 14-17% right up till 
the end of the 90s. One third of the economy is “in shadow”. Is this a lot or a little? It is normal, 
if compared to Europe. This is the level of Greece, Italy or Spain. In Scandinavia, Germany and 
Austria this “shadow” is smaller.  
 
The problem though is that according to the unofficial estimates (based on employment, 
consumption of electric energy and cement, import of oil products and food, transportation 
volume) share of informal economy in Moldova is much bigger – about a half of the GDP.  
 
And, involuntarily, it became apparent through the Government Decision “On results of the RM 
Government report to the Parliament” #894 of July 21, 2003: “problems conditioned by natural 
disasters, shadow economy, contraband are mentioned as top-priority”[1] (italicized by I.O.).  
 
As regards the level of negative impact upon the state budget, SE is indeed like a natural disaster. 
But unlike drought or heavy showers it is a handmade phenomenon.  
 
It should be admitted though that at the beginning of the transition period SE played the role of a 
social shock-absorber and was a source of additional incomes for the population, workplaces, as 
well as cheap goods. Now, when metastases of semi-legal and criminalized SE and corruption 
stroke the young state, they create evident barriers to attraction of investments and development 
of civilized forms of entrepreneurship. SE aggravates property differentiation of the population, 
exacerbates problem of poverty that the state will not be able to solve (even given high GDP 
growth rates), if the budget is replenished only by the legal sector of the economy and there is no 
efficient mechanism of entrepreneurial income redistribution.  
 
SE is many-sided. It originates from imperfection of the legislation, labyrinths of regulatory 
bureaucracy, clannish business, “transparency” of customs borders and “benevolence” of tax 
bodies. Its effects are also many-sided: macroeconomic, budget, regional and social.  
One can judge on the level of SE based on the contrast between 14% Moldova’s GDP growth 
over the last three years and the difficult situation of the country’s budget, which lacks funds not 
only for investments and education, but for daily social tasks as well.  
 
Anyone can see the main, the most profitable SE goods: oil products, food and alcohol, tobacco 
products, medicines; while the most “unobserved”, unaccounted by the statistics branches are 
trade (where SE is 60%), constructions and transportation, restaurant business, real estate 
operations.  
 
Shadow flows of oil products and alcohol are striking. Their increase over the last years is by 
implication also confirmed by the statistics. Thus, according to the RM energy balance, officially 
accounted import of liquid fuel to Moldova dropped from 1,5 mil ton of conventional fuel in 
1996 down to 577-645 thou ton in the last years; alcohol – from 29,7 mil USD in 1996 to 3,0 mil 
USD[2].  
 
But with all this going on oil products market capacity of Moldova is currently estimated at 1,0-
1,2 mil ton. The main consumer of oil products (gasoline and diesel fuel) is motor transport and 
real sector machinery. Number of registered motor vehicles in Moldova reached 900 thou units, 
including 280 thou cars, 15,2 thou buses and minibuses, etc. Meanwhile, statistics states that oil 
products consumption of motor transport is just a half of the mid-90’s indicator (in agriculture it 
is less than a third)[3].  
 
One of the prerequisites for the shadow overflow of oil products from abroad has formed on the 
1st of April, 2003, when TMR lowered excises for gasoline (40 USD per ton) and diesel fuel (20 
USD per ton). In the Republic of Moldova these excises are set to 88,9 USD and 37,04 USD per 
ton respectively. Rare initiatives to curtail the oil products smuggling yield usually no practical 
result (marking of gasoline with special dyestuffs, creation of mobile tax stations on roads, 
control at gasoline stations, introduction of sales registers).  
 
SE regional aspect is mostly showing in municipality of Chisinau and “Moldovan-Moldavian 
trade” with Transnistria. In Chisinau and its suburbs real estate operations, different types of 
trade, pharmaceuticals and restaurant business are the most profitable and the least controllable. 
Obtaining construction permissions – town-planning certificates and authorizations – remains the 
most difficult problem for economic units. It takes up to 170 days and a minimum of 1 thou USD 
to get all necessary acts for construction or commission of a finished building.  
 
Besides, so called “Transnistrian conflict” became a large-scale business for both parties long 
ago. Transnistrian import volumes are worth paying attention: in 2002 for instance it exceeded 
export by 206,2 mil USD or 82.4% to the region’s GDP, while this indicator in Moldova 
accounted only for 24.2%. Statistics records import of specific goods in volumes that exceed the 
regional needs considerably (oil products, alcohol, cigarettes, sugar, cosmetics, medicines, etc.) 
and their subsequent re-export, to the Republic of Moldova primarily, whose share within the 
Transnistria’s “export” officially accounts for no less than 25%, while within the import to the 
region – only 7-8%. Substantial misbalance of Transnistrian external trade and such countries as 
Ukraine and Byelorussia is also interesting: import in 2001, for example, exceeded export by 7,8 
and 5,3 times respectively. Noteworthy is the fact that this excess is a new know-how of the 
latest time. Earlier, statistics recorded an inverse situation: in 1997, for instance, export of 
Transnistrian goods to Ukraine was twice as much as import, to Byelorussia – 2,4 times more.  
 
There are different “schemes” of “export” to the Republic of Moldova of goods previously 
imported to Transnistria or produced there. Most of them take advantage of gaps and “unclear 
spots” in legal documents of Moldova related to its economic relations with Transnistria. There 
is also a manifest smuggling which employs both economic agents of Moldova and Transnistria, 
as well as those of third countries.  
 
How can SE be reduced? Should it be suppressed, fought or legalized? World Bank has recently 
realized a research in Moldova “State Regulation Costs Assessment” in 13 areas of economic 
activity regulated by the state, which covered 630 enterprises of different legal forms, sectors and 
localities[4].  
 
The conclusion is obvious – an efficient government policy is necessary to reduce the SE 
through: 
 
 Raising efficiency of state bodies and reformation of the state regulation system; 
 Stimulation of legal business, support of small and medium entrepreneurship and creation 
of a favorable regime for this sector; 
 Creation of stimuli for legalization of the shadow capitals, strengthening the protection of 
property and entrepreneurs; 
 Forced suppression of the criminal SE, contraband and criminal drug and human traffic 
especially. 
 
All these actions have to be realized at the background of purposeful and consequent market 
reforms given the concurrent strengthening of legal and financial state control over the economy. 
And the main thing is: shadow economy must not be considered a natural disaster! 
 
 
[1] Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, #155-158, 25 iulie 2003, p. 89 
[2] Statistical bulletin of the Republic of Moldova – 2002, Department of Statistics and 
Sociology, 2002, pp. 302-428 
[3] Ibidem 
[4] Независимая Молдова, №124, 25 июня 2003 г. 
 
 
 
 
Investments are needed 
 
by Galina Selari 
 
 
The maintenance of sustainable economic growth is declared as a priority by the government. At 
the same time, it would be rather precipitate to assert that factors of sustainable development are 
already available in the country. There are too many alarming signs: external debt and problem 
of fulfillment of debt liabilities, aggravated as a result of "freezing" country’s relations with the 
IMF, scarcity of investments, both internal, and external, evident insufficient growth of new jobs 
and mass migration abroad of most active part of the able-bodied population. According to the 
Ministry of Economy it is essential to increase the volume of domestic investments by 15% - 
17% and to attract not less than USD 80 - 90 million of external investments to ensure the 
expected GDP growth rates by 6-7%.  
 
The Investment Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, as it is known, was adopted at the 
beginning of 2002. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of its implementation, so put 
attention on current situation. At the beginning of the year 2003 in the Republic of Moldova 
were registered 2670 entities with foreign capital, from which only about 1.5 thousand or only 
half reported about their activity. Since the moment of registration the total volume of equity 
capital of the entities has reached USD 671 million, of which USD 414 million (62%) were 
allocated by foreign investors from 87 countries. At the same time only 14% of the total number 
of entities have the equity capital exceeding USD 500 thousand; entities equity capital of which 
does not exceed USD 10 thousand (70% of all entities) mainly prevail.  
 
In spite of the fact that the absolute values of foreign direct investments in economy has been 
increasing gradually - according to the National Bank data at the end of 2002 the total volume of 
foreign direct investments constituted about USD 720 million - Moldova is still among the 
countries with one of the lowest rate of investments per capita which is USD 31 only.  
 
Let's turn to the independent expert’s assessment. The World Investment Report for 2002, 
prepared by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) used the share of 
foreign direct investments in the growth fixed capital formation as one of the indicators of 
effectiveness of state policy in attracting foreign capital. In general this figure constitutes about 
25% for the countries of Central and South Eastern Europe and for Moldova it was more than 
40%, so it needs some additional explanations. According to the report authors, this "leading" 
position reflects in Moldovan case just a very low GDP per capita level and a small size of the 
internal market.  
 
Other two indicators are used in the UNCTAD Report: Inward FDI Performance Index (the ratio 
of a country’s share in global foreign direct investment flows to its share in global GDP) and 
Inward FDI Potential Index (based largely on the structural economic factors – the rate of growth 
of GDP, per capita GDP, share of exports in GDP, telephone lines per 1000 inhabitance, 
commercial energy use per capita, share of research and development expenditures in gross 
national income, share of tertiary students in the population and country risk). Use of these 
indicators allows, on the one hand, to abstract from size of internal market (Inward FDI 
Performance Index) and, on the other hand, to range countries basing on their potential in the 
field of attracting foreign direct investments (Inward FDI Potential Index).  
 
According to the Inward FDI Performance Index Moldova is included in the group of countries 
with high index value (for the period from 1992 to 2001 it permanently was 1.7). It means that 
the country attracted more foreign direct investments that could be expected on the basis of 
relative GDP. According to the Inward FDI Potential Index the situation is, unfortunately, 
different. If for the period 1992 - 1994 the value of the index was 0.285 (46-th place among 140 
countries), in 1998-2001 the value of the index considerably decreased and constituted only 
0.194 (109-th place for Moldova, respectively).  
 
With regard to the both indicators, Moldova was among “front-runners” countries in 1992 - 
1994, but because in 1998-2001 the result of significant declines in the Inward FDI Potential 
Index, the country is referred to the group of the “above potential economies”, which means that 
in order to attract foreign direct investments to the country further structural economic 
transformations and development of industrial potential are required. Thus, as the evident 
reserves for economic growth have been exhausted in Moldova well coordinated practical 
actions on modernization of the Moldovan economy contrary to formal optimistic forecasts take 
on special significance. Moldova is a small open economy. Joining the WTO and European or 
regional structures (Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Euro Asian Economic Community 
etc.) provides not only access to new markets, but also new opportunities in the field of 
realization of the investment projects, simultaneously increasing the requirements to economic 
and investment policy. Moldova took on the collective responsibility for creation and 
development of a favorable investment climate in the region as a whole, having signed within the 
framework of the Stability Pact the Declaration on Attracting Investment to South Eastern 
Europe, in July 2002.  
 
Will be the year 2003 a turning-point? Meanwhile, it is necessary to recognize, that the last two 
years, by virtue of circumstances, have not brought constructive changes in investment policy. 
There were adjustments to the legislation, initiatives on strengthening methods of government 
regulation in economy, etc.. However, the implementation of some important though politically 
complex intentions in the field of structural reforms has been slowed down. No noticeable results 
in the improvement of investment climate, in the elimination of separation of the banks and the 
real sector and in the reduction of shadow economy have been attained. Inappropriate 
management has complicated the relations with foreign investors and international organizations.  
 
The present year, nevertheless, is characterized by livening up of dialogue between authorities 
and civil society mainly with the representatives of business circles both Moldovan and foreign 
(January - the Moldovan-Bulgarian economic forum, April - the Moldovan-Russian economic 
form, June - first session of the Moldovan-American committee on economic and investment 
cooperation, July - the Moldovan-Israeli businessmen’s forum).  
 
In the common opinion of the participants of all these meetings, Moldova has many advantages, 
which could attract foreign investors: the geo-economic location, which opens the opportunity of 
export both to CIS countries – the interest of western investors - and to Eastern and Western 
Europe - interest of eastern investors (Russia and China); well educated (81% of the population 
in able-bodied age have secondary education, for the countries with low and average level of 
income this indicator constitutes about 50%), trained and wage competitive labor force; 
bilinguism; Moldova feels itself comfortable in cultural environment, both in East, and West.  
 
Unfortunately, the effective use of these advantages hasn’t been fully realized so far, as the 
President V. Voronin put it, “these advantages have to be recreated and money has to be invested 
into them”. So, again, there appears a problem with quality of investment climate in Moldova, as 
the criterion of market reforms maturity, confidence of business circles in steady property, 
judicial system, etc.  
 
Strange though, the Republic of Moldova, perhaps, is the only CIS country, which does not have 
the Law on Investment Activity and as a consequence, the state policy in the field of attraction of 
internal investments is not precisely determined. Probably, this fact explains the low volume of 
internal investments. It is impossible to consider the sum of Lei 1.5 billion (2002) sufficient for 
sustainable development of the country’s economy. According to the latest data of the 
Department of Statistics and Sociology in the first half of 2003 investments amounted to Lei 
897.8 million (about USD 63 million) even though it is 30% higher as compared with the same 
period of 2002 it is evidently not enough. According the sources of investments, self-funding 
(including individuals’ resources) constituted 75%, foreign investments – 16% and only 5% was 
the investments on account of the state budget. It is clear, that foreign investors will not invest in 
the economy, in which local businessmen refuse to invest.  
 
Drafting of the Law on Investment Activity, which is to even the rights of local investors with 
those of foreign ones, started in 2001 and the terms of its adoption have not still been 
determined. However, the country has some regional experience: it is the Law on Investments 
and Investment Activity in Territorial Autonomous Unit Gagauz-Yeri (2001). In contrast to the 
Republic of Moldova’s Law on Foreign Investments (recognized by the independent foreign 
experts as one of the best among similar laws of CIS countries), the law of Gagauz-Yeri does not 
make any difference between foreign and local investors. On the territory of Gagauz-Yeri all 
investing agents have incentives stipulated by the Moldovan legislation, as well as additional 
ones according to the local law. Therefore, today, Gagauz-Yeri, in a sense, can be appreciated by 
potential investors as an oasis in the Moldovan investment environment.  
 
Businessmen, local as well as foreign, wish for a transparent market with predicted rules. They 
are eager to work to make the Moldovan market one of most favorable in the region. The first 
words of Mr. M. Lupu in the capacity of new Minister of Economy (august 2003) are concerned 
the same matter: “We should win back confidence in state economic policy consistency and 
predictability of both international donors and Moldovan business circles. Without this our main 
task – attraction of sizeable foreign investments - can’t be solved”.  
 
 
 
 
The Budget with many unknown variables 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
At the beginning of September the Government website, www.moldova.md, published the draft 
state budget of the Republic of Moldova for 2004. This is a good example of “glasnost”. 
Moreover, since this draft will be presented to the Parliament only in October and then 
legislators will discuss it, all of us who are now called “civil society” have the opportunity to 
take part in this process.  
At first sight, optimism of the 2004 budget is astounding. The budget is envisaged to entail no 
deficit. As before, it is notable for its “social orientation” – 38.7% of all expenditures will be 
directed to social assistance, healthcare, education, science and culture. Besides, 340 mil MDL 
are envisaged for raising wages of budget workers. There is an intention to reduce the tax 
burden: income tax is planned to be cut down from 22 to 20%, social fund payments – from 29 to 
27%. Agriculture is not forgotten. 30 mil MDL are allotted to form a fund to subsidize 
agricultural producers.  
 
All this occurs against the background of positive macroeconomic reference points of the next 
year – 5.0% GDP growth, low inflation of 4.5% and a national currency exchange rate of 15,2 
MDL/1 USD.  
 
Where could one get these revenues? Most of them (65.0%) – as before – will be provided by 
VAT and excises. Non-tax collections are estimated at just 421.5 mil MDL. Unlike in the 
budgets of European countries land and real estate tax collections are quite paltry – only 4.2%. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Finance hopes to obtain donor grants (289 mil MDL) and the proceeds 
from privatization – 304 mil MDL.  
 
Upon examination of the draft one starts feeling an involuntary sympathy with its authors, the 
Government and, in the end, the country’s life during the next year. It contains too many 
“unknowns”. The main questionable issues are as follows: 
 
 Will the country enjoy external financial support? Who will give money and how much? 
How are old debts to be paid? There are 371.9 mil MDL (24.5 mil USD) foreseen for 
these goals, which is 3 times less than the impending payments; 
 How effective for economic activization will tax rate reduction turn out? Will it not 
destabilize budget revenues? 
 Will it be possible to reduce the shadow economy (according to the Department of 
Statistics, it provides no less than 1/3 GDP), especially in its most significant 
“strongholds” – alcohol, tobacco, fuel, medicines, real estate and export-import 
operations? 
 What will be possible to privatize? “Moldtelecom”? Northern electric power distribution 
networks? Wine factories? “Zorile” or “Viorica”? It was not possible this year; 
 Do we still have to increase expenditures for maintaining the state apparatus? Shouldn’t 
we still this year bring into effect Iovv’s plan to reorganize Government structure and 
functions? After all, the apparatus of some branch ministries “devours” more money per 
year than enterprises “under their jurisdiction” bring into the state budget! What state 
apparatus quality are we talking about when only 14 out of 32 new raions have presented 
draft raion budgets to the Ministry of Finance on term (1st of August)? 
 How can wages be raised when wage arrears are already estimated at 176.5 mil MDL 
(12.7 mil USD) having grown over the last month by 23.9 mil MDL? What are the 
sources of finance (211.7 mil MDL) for social compensations to some categories of the 
population (invalids, war veterans, families with many children, etc.)? This year most of 
these means were provided by the European Commission, USAID and other donors. 
 
Everything indicates that there were difficulties in designing the draft. Its social orientation is 
due to poverty. Other countries make up “budgets of development”, while we allot only 90 mil 
MDL for investment (1.7% of expenditures!), 66 mil MDL for scientific research (including 3,2 
mil MDL to the Academy of Sciences, which is less than the cost of maintaining some 
ministries).  
 
The initial variant of the 2004 budget is a child of the Ministry of Finances. The participation of 
other state bodies, including the Ministry of Economy, was minimal. It is interesting that the 
Ministry of Finances is found within the state budget structure in the honorable section 1 – 
„Servicii de stat cu destinaţie generală” (together with the Parliament, Presidential apparatus and 
State Chancellery of the Government), while the Ministry of Economy, as a poor relation, 
follows all branch ministries in the final section 19 – „Alte servicii legate de activitatea 
economică”.  
 
In the meantime, one would expect the participation of the Ministry of Economy to be decisive 
during elaboration of the philosophy and main allocations of the budget for 2004. For the sake of 
the cause the Ministry of Finance that manages the technique of budget design and execution 
quite well needs a partner and an opponent.  
 
To tell the truth, one should admit that it was the Ministry of Economy that placed itself in such a 
humiliating position. It was as early as spring when the Ministry (by 31st of March, as 
coordinated with the IMF and WB) was to finish the work on the Economic Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy for 2004-2006. In this case, the budget for 2004 would represent an 
instrument to realize this strategy in the first year and would be linked with the solution of key 
problems of this mid-term.  
 
Since there is still no Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (discussion with civil 
society is promised in autumn) and the state budget for 2004 was made up autonomously, two 
paths of development are possible: 
 
1. The Parliament will discuss and approve the budget quickly (and formally), aware of so 
many “unknowns” that it will inevitably have to introduce multiple amendments during 
execution of the budget in 2004 (as in 2003);  
2. Consideration of the budget will last till the end of the year and it will be already the 
2004 Q1 when it will be approved. In this case, one would be able to discuss the realities 
and unclear positions of the budget with the autumn missions of the IMF, WB and other 
donors, and perhaps take more determined actions to launch the “second wave” of 
reforms in the country and the practical participation of the Republic of Moldova in 
European integration processes.  
 
Naturally, the second variant is more preferable. But its realization requires the united creative 
work of the Parliament and Government, rather than the Ministry of Finances alone. One thing is 
clear: we are in for a very difficult year financially.  
 
The paradox is that the country’s threatening budget problems intensify against the background 
of the sprightly GDP growth rate: +2.1% in 2000, +6.1% in 2001, +7.2% in 2002 and no less 
than 7-8% in the current year. The forecast for 2004 of both the Government (+5.0%) and 
external experts (+4-5%) is still optimistic. No one is talking about a default yet. Perhaps in fact, 
it may pass us by once more and we will experience the viability of the old slogan “There are no 
such fortresses the Bolsheviks cannot storm” again? 
 
 
 
 
European integration concept - at last… 
 
by Mariana Argint 
 
 
The Government has finally prepared the draft of the "Conception for European Integration of 
the Republic of Moldova". Its discussion and more accurate definition are yet to come.  
 
This is a very belated document. And it is also unclear why it is called "conception" instead of 
"national strategy" as in other countries? Thus, it was November 1993 when President Mircea 
Snegur sent a letter to the European Commission Chairman Jack Delore proposing to stir up the 
formation of political and legal grounds for relations between the Republic of Moldova and the 
European Union (EU). In 1994, the Commission assessed the situation and acknowledged the 
positive changes in Moldova - the first multiparty parliamentary elections, the new Constitution, 
liberalization of the economy and financial macro stabilization, and democratization of societal 
relations.  
 
This was followed by the signature of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
between the EU and Moldova (1994) and its coming into effect (1998), which was an official 
recognition of Moldova as an EU partner for political dialogue and legal and economic 
cooperation.  
 
This agreement though, unlike the EU "association agreements" with the Central and Eastern 
European countries, by no means was a prelude to further accession to the EU. It was rather 
meant to Europeanise our young state and bring the quality of its state system, economy and 
social life as close as possible to the Copenhagen criteria of the EU (1993) for new eventual EU 
members.  
 
Unfortunately, the EU-Moldova agreement has been implemented slowly over 1998-2000, and 
the fault was mostly ours. As strange as it may seem, despite the new emphases emerging every 
year in policy and practice of the country's transformation, the agreement has never underwent 
any adjustments. Both parties - Brussels and Chisinau - admit that the PCA potential has not 
been used in full measure. Last year, at last, it was decided to concentrate the cooperation in five 
areas: legal harmonization, customs and cross-border cooperation, fighting criminality, 
examination of approaches towards interaction of the parties within the Free Trade Area, and 
investments.  
 
Over the past decade Moldova nonetheless preferred staying within the so called "grey zone", a 
zone of geopolitical uncertainty. But even in this situation the country has already received aid 
worth more than 240 million euro from the EU within the framework of TACIS and other 
programs. In addition, it has been announced that another 50 mil euro will be alotted to Moldova 
for 2003-2004. These funds are meant for macroeconomic support, social assistance, stimulation 
of private sector and export, as well as for reformation of the administrative and judiciary 
systems.  
At present, though, Moldova's leadership puts the question more assertively - it has declared that 
European integration is an external policy priority of the country. According to President 
Vladimir Voronin (January 2003, during a meeting with the diplomatic corps), "the Moldovan 
leadership perceives European integration as a three-dimensional process. Firstly, this is a path to 
reintegration of Moldova itself based on modern legal standards. Secondly, European path means 
for Moldova modernization of the country's economy based on universally recognized 
mechanisms functioning in Europe and in the world. Thirdly, European integration means 
formation and development of our political institutions, reformation of public administration 
with strict delimitation of functions and powers proper to a democratic state with market 
economy".  
 
The President expressed himself even in a more clear cut way on Independence Day, 27 August 
2003: "the program of Moldova's European integration is the main strategic document for us, 
which is superior to all party programs and current tasks of all power branches".  
 
These are our intentions. The Government is convinced that there are no fundamental 
contradictions between the pro-CIS and pro-EU policies. Apparently after the CIS Summit 
hosted in Yalta on September 18-19, Moldova's belief in CIS was shattered significantly, 
whereas in the EU, on the contrary, was strengthened.  
 
However, European Commission has a more clear position on this: in the mid-term perspective 
Moldova has no chances of becoming an EU member. In a more distant future this is not 
excluded. Possibilities of this will grow as the country connects to the processes of stabilization 
and association in South East Europe. The EU has recently declared that it was ready to work out 
a plan in 2004 of priority EU actions for Moldova.  
 
European choice is a strong incentive for Moldova, since it is this choice that provides the 
country with both democracy and institution-building, internal stability and external security.  
 
Moldova today is a partitioned state located at the periphery of the uniting Europe, whose 
existence is complicated by the frozen Transdnistrian conflict. Efforts to reunify the country 
within a "common state" will enable Moldova to use the Transdnistrian issue as a good 
argument: conflict resolution would not be sustainable unless backed up by perspectives of EU 
integration, by promises, for Transdnistria as well, to take advantage of the benefits of political 
and economic association with European Union.  
 
Proposing new and new initiatives along the European direction (as also regards settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict), we should not slacken efforts to realize political and economic clauses of 
the EU-Moldova PCA. What can PCA give to Moldova as regards approaching Europe? This 
includes:  
 
 Creation of joint bodies (including at the higher level) to examine all problems related to 
partnership and cooperation between the RM and EU;  
 Formation of the "functioning" legal environment through approximation of Moldovan 
legislation to the EU one;  
 Accustoming to universally recognized rules of international trade;  
 Gradual transition to normal conditions of competition, which in the end should raise the 
economy's efficiency;  
 Financial assistance of the EU in developing key sectors of our country, which helps 
implement economic and social reforms.  
 
One of the priority directions of the PCA implementation is the creation of a free trade area 
between Moldova and EU. It is important to mention that since at present Moldova still cannot 
assume obligations to create an area of free trade with the EU (due to the underdeveloped 
competitive environment and administrative capacities), the EU is willing to consider new 
possibilities of providing Moldovan goods with access to the market within the framework 
stipulated by the WTO.  
 
Now, the most realistic for Moldova is its participation in processes of sectorial integration with 
the EU. This means ensuring Moldova with autonomous trade preferences followed by the Free 
Trade Agreement, infrastructure development, border control etc.  
 
Speaking of Moldova's European vector, one should consider both "pros" and "cons" of such 
orientation. Indeed, it could be already in the near future when Moldova as a new neighbor of the 
EU will be able to count on enhanced financial and technical assistance, facilitated visa regime 
and access to new markets.  
 
At the same time, given Moldova's slowness, some of these advantages may turn into problems.  
 
Thus, for instance, transition of the united Europe to common norms and standards will 
undoubtedly facilitate movement of goods throughout its market. With this in mind, Moldova 
should provide "euro-harmonization" of its standards and requirements and the conformity 
assessment procedures. Sluggishness will sharply worsen the access of Moldovan products to 
European markets, especially foodstuffs.  
 
Another important aspect is attracting foreign investments into the country. And this requires 
urgent improvement of the country's investment climate; otherwise, after the EU enlargement, it 
will be our neighbors - the new EU members - who will become the main recipients of European 
subsidies and technical assistance programs. It is not excluded it will be the new members' 
economies that the EU will encourage investments into, leaving the "tardy" Moldova outside this 
activity.  
 
The process of Moldova's rapprochement with Europe requires a lot of effort and time. 
Therefore, it is not rare when the question arises: is EU membership an absolute necessity for 
Moldova? To answer this question, a more detailed analysis of the impact of EU policies 
(Common Agricultural Policy, Social and Labor Market policies, Standard and Costs in 
Environmental Protection etc.) on our national interests is necessary.  
 
According to President Vladimir Voronin, "the enthusiasm of all branches of power is now 
focused on European integration". But this enthusiasm (!) also requires a wider public support. It 
is still unstable. According to opinion polls, the population favors EU and CIS almost equally. 
Taking this into account, the two-level EU policy concerning Moldova is important - at the level 
of the Government and the civil society. This will be the case when in our country the notion of 
"integration" will link closer to such notions as "democracy" and "development".  
 
Ultimately, all of us need a democratically stable Moldova, integral from the political, social and 
territorial points of view. And its approach to Europe will undoubtedly enhance the external 
positive impact upon the quality of governance, business and living in our country.  
 
 
 
 
Can de-urbanization be stopped? 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
The new times have brought considerable changes to the Republic of Moldova. Such changes 
include openness to the world, macroeconomic stabilization, property reform, rise of the market 
and private sector, land privatization, trade liberalization (external and internal) and 
democratization of public life. There are, however, spheres of life where changes have been of a 
destructive character. Amongst them are expansion of the poverty zone and social inequality, 
emigration and mass labor migration abroad, the deindustrialization of towns, the collapse of 
social infrastructure in rural areas and finally the stagnation of ecosystems.  
 
The majority of these negative processes appear locally. Despite this, problems of managing 
local development got the least attention of all our reforms.  
 
In part, this is an echo of recent past, since branch-like state management dominated during the 
soviet period and it was central government and branch ministries that disposed of all 
management instruments and resources. After 1991, ministries (except the Ministry of Finance) 
were deprived of instruments such as the right to distribute investments, funds, etc., yet local 
bodies (districts and towns) did not get them instead – either in the form of self-administration 
functions, or in the form of municipal property or sufficient incomes for local budgets. Instead of 
the “federalization of the country’s budget” we got quite the opposite – its even higher 
centralization. The lack of consideration for the local needs is one of the main causes of 
inefficient reforms in Moldova.  
 
De-urbanization as a fact. The transition in Moldova was marked (among other things) by 
reduction of urban population. It numbered 1.91 mil persons throughout the whole territory of 
the country, including Transnistria, as of January 1, 2003 or 45.3 percent of the population. On 
the right bank of the Nistru river it numbered 1.49 mil, or 41.4 percent of the total population. 
The main causes are the deindustrialization of towns, stagnation of their infrastructure, and 
depopulation, which is deeper in towns than in rural areas.  
 
The fastest urbanization of the country, as is well known, occurred during 1960s – 1980s when 
circa 300 new industrial enterprises were placed on its territory. They used both imported raw 
materials (in the energy sector, machinery, light and furniture industries) and domestic ones (in 
the food industry and in the production of construction materials). As a result, the urban 
population grew from 670 mil persons to 2,1 mil persons over the 60-90’s that is, threefold! The 
urban skeleton of the country was formed of 21 towns (a large one – Chisinau, three medium 
ones – Balti, Tiraspol and Bender; the rest are small towns with populations of no more than fifty 
thousand people) and 45 urban villages.  
 
After 1990, under the complex crisis of the economy, the urban population dropped by 154,4 
thou persons, the figure equal to the number of people living in Orhei, Soroca, Ungheni and 
Cahul taken together and exceeding the current population of Balti, whose population in turn has 
reduced by approximately 10.0 percent.  
 
Urban population dynamics (including Transnistria) 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2002 
Thou pers 670,1 1130,1 1586,5 2069,3 1914,9 
Percent 23.0 32.2 40.1 47.4 45.3 
 
The crisis of cities has mostly affected small towns and new urban villages, especially those 
based on a single enterprise: Rezina (a cement factory), Cantemir (a tinned food factory), 
Briceni, Alexandreni, Glodeni (sugar refineries), etc. Chisinau turned out to be relatively stable. 
Its population (within comparable boundaries) reduced slightly: from 661,4 thou persons 
according to the 1989 census to 660,7 thou persons as of the beginning of 2003. But it has been 
the municipality of Chisinau where the most part of business of the country has been 
concentrated: 68 percent of all small and medium enterprises, 75 percent of their output and 57 
percent of the employed.  
 
Among Moldovan citizens going abroad 35-38 percent in the last few years have been urban 
residents (according to the Department of Statistics and Sociology). In the Q2 2003, for instance, 
there were 88,3 thou of them, which is equal to the population of ten(!) towns like Cantemir.  
 
Moldova is manifestly starting to look more rural. This occurs against a background of a rather 
urbanized structure of its neighbors – Romania and Ukraine, where urban population accounts 
for 55% and 68% correspondingly. The only European country where urban population is 
smaller than the Moldovan one is Albania.  
 
Will the 2003 administrative-territorial reform provide for a revival of towns? Most likely, the 
answer to this question will be negative. The return to 40 territorial raions (32 on the right bank 
of the Nistru, 3 in Gagauzia and 5 in Transnistria), most of which have small demographic and 
production potential, might “bring the authority closer to the people”, but it surely will not allow 
the concentration of resources – either from the state budget, or from the outside. All cities 
(except Chisinau and Balti) and districts will remain doomed for a long time to depend on 
transfers allotted by the Government. It is indicative how the Government (Decree #93-r of 
September 8, 2003) plans to hold its field sessions in Straseni (September), Ocnita (October), 
Basarabeasca (November) and Stefan-Voda (December). These sessions are intended to examine 
issues that are quite topical for these towns and districts: such as entrepreneurship development, 
provision of the population with natural gas, electric power, drinkable water and so on. Among 
those mentioned as being “responsible for the preparation of these sessions” were the Ministry of 
Economy, Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, Ministry of Ecology and Constructions 
and a series of departments. But no local bodies were mentioned. Besides, towns are now “built-
in” into raions: all interrelations between the towns and the state budget (including transfers) are 
carried out through the raion financial services.  
 
Such an attitude towards towns cannot be considered as productive. Moreover, ever since the 
14th century the authorities ruling over Moldova divided the country in different ways (such as 
tsinuts, rayas, judets, raions), but the country’s “skeleton” has always been “cemented” by cities 
and roads. Now, taking account both of the current general distress and of future tasks, one 
should admit that it is not realistic both to raise and equalize development throughout the 
country’s territory concurrently. It is necessary to mark out peculiar “growth poles”.  
 
Towns as poles of local growth. World history gives many examples of the stimulating and 
organizing role of cities in the development of regions and countries, for example, the city-states 
of ancient Greece, Hanseatic cities of medieval Germany, the towns-colonies of the Black Sea, 
etc. Towns played a particular role, especially during crises, in Moldovan history as well.  
 
Taking this into account, the concept of nodal or polarized districts formed around cities as the 
nuclei of administrative, economic and social activities is universally recognized in regional 
theory and practice. The functional interconnections in such districts occur most effectively 
through flows of labor, resources, goods and services and transport ties. Towns as growth poles 
of such regions determine the development character of territories, which are drawn towards 
them, and concentrate such spheres as entrepreneurship, “business for business”, investments, 
financial operations and education.  
 
The regional policy realized during the 1970s – 1980s in the MSSR (besides elements of 
voluntarism) in the scientific respect was based on distinguishing homogenous regions (zones of 
agricultural specialization), nodal regions (towns – industrial parks, promising settlements), as 
well as programmed regions (such as programs for developing Chisinau or the South of the 
country).  
 
The principal long-term documents were the “Multilevel regional planning of the MSSR” and 
“MSSR regional settlement system”. In correspondence with these plans the country was 
demarcated by 4 group settlement systems (North, Center, Southeast and South) and 8 planned 
zones (their centers were Edintets, Balti, Ribnita, Ungheni, Chisinau, Tiraspol-Tighina, Comrat 
and Cahul), which – in their turn – were divided into 36 subzones and 86 microzones.  
Depending on the complexity of their functions towns were divided into 4 levels: multifunctional 
centers of group settlement systems; interdistrict centers, whose influence extends to several 
low-level districts; towns – centers of low-level districts; local centers.  
 
During the last decade, the scientific and project basis of regional policy in the Republic of 
Moldova was not modernized and the situation at the local level became worse everywhere and 
to virtually equal degree.  
 
That is why the Government’s possible initiative (developed by the Ministry of Economy or the 
Ministry of Ecology, Constructions and Local Development?) for sustainability and realizing the 
concept “Towns as Growth Poles” could base itself (just for a start!) upon its “predecessors” – 
the research output of the “NII planirovania”, “KievNIIgiprograd”, “Moldgiprostroy” (now 
“Urbanproiect”) and “Moldgiproselstroy” (now “Ruralproiect”): the “Multilevel regional 
planning of the MSSR”, “MSSR regional settlement system”, and “Methods and variants to form 
the network of administrative-territorial districts” approved in its time by the Government and 
still in operation owing to the lack of new elaborations.  
 
Based on the aforementioned there are 12 towns that might serve as possible “growth poles” – 
for economic, social and cultural activization of the surrounding territories: Balti, Edinet, Soroca 
in the Northern region, Chisinau, Orhei and Ungheni in the Central one, Comrat, Cahul and 
Taraclia in the Southern one, and Tiraspol, Ribnita and Dubasari in the Southeastern region of 
the country.  
 
Focusing the attention of the Government on a limited circle of cities will allow saving time and 
resources. Such an approach will surely provoke objections both of the administrations of other 
towns and raions, and their lobbyists in the Parliament and the Government. In this case 
however, we will once more miss the opportunities that marking out priorities in economic 
policy could bring. We have already made the mistake at the dawn of reforms of not choosing 
priorities of both manufacturing industry and agro-industrial complex, and we are trying to 
rectify it now.  
 
The practical implementation of the concept “Towns as Growth Poles” presupposes the 
formation of its legal basis, trustworthy statistics on towns and raions, and a mechanism for 
financial interrelations between the center and those key towns. This is not an easy work, but it is 
a concrete one, and so it can become quite a constructive part of the Economic Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) that the Government is formulating now as its economic 
policy main document for the next few years. 
 
 
 
 
Moldova – Transnistria: Clash of Economic Interests 
 
by Galina Selari 
 
 
Moldova and Transnistria agreed on the “common state” formula and 5 common spaces – legal, 
economic, customs, defence and cultural as far back as 1999. Further steps seemed a mere 
technical matter – documents’ development.  
 
But it turned out to be quite different from what was expected. Withdrawal of rights to use 
customs stamps of the Republic of Moldova from Transnistria “materialised” in the notion of 
“economic blockade”. Gradually increasing tension has been becoming stronger and stronger 
during 2003, in spite of the fact that the parties have, as before, agreed that reintegration is the 
single opportunity both for conflict settlement and ensuring of economic revival of the two sub-
regions. To achieve this goal the elaboration of the Constitution of the united state has been 
started. Nevertheless, the nerve-strain can be compared to some extent with the situation that 
preceded the 1992 confrontation, but now, however, the proscenium is taken not by immaterial 
problems – language and history - but by economic interests focusing on whom the property 
belongs to and who will control the financial flows. That’s why the current aggravation of the 
situation represents no less danger than that that occurred in early 90s.  
 
Insisting on their own rights the parties seem to compete with each other in pilling up restrictions 
for the economic agents and population of the far bank. And this is happening notwithstanding 
the fact that as early as 1992 after the “heated” phase of the conflict it was agreed that 
“conflicting parties considered application of any sanctions or blockades inadmissible. In this 
context any barriers to free movement of goods, services and persons shall be eliminated”.  
 
Practices used during last months by both parties in order to ensure these economic freedoms 
have given rise to surprise. Let us bring them back to the mind:  
 
First act: spring – summer 2003  
 
 May 15, 2003 – the Customs Department of the Republic of Moldova and the State 
Customs Service of Ukraine signed the Protocol on Mutual Recognition of Motor 
Waybills, Commercial and Customs Documents and, as a result, starting from May 25, 
2003 the entrance of goods with Transnistrian customs documents to Ukrainian territory 
was ceased;  
 June 12, 2003 – the Government of the Republic of Moldova introduced temporary (till 
January 1, 2004) registration of Transnistrian economic entities in corresponding 
Moldovan institutions.  
The Administration of Transnistria considered these as toughening of “economic 
blockade” and Chisinau’s pretensions to the sub-region’s property and took retaliatory as 
well as prohibitive, measures;  
 July 1, 2003 – gas supply to the villages Malovata and Cocieri which are under the 
Republic of Moldova’s jurisdiction but are situated on the left bank of the Dniester was 
suspended on the grounds of arrears.  
 July 14, 2003 – the Decree of I. Smirnov introduced a special customs duty at the rate of 
100% of goods customs value for all commodities imported from the Republic of 
Moldova ;  
 July 18, 2003 – the Decree on Establishment of Most Favourite Nation Treatment in 
Trade and Economic Relations with Ukraine was issued.  
 
Further, an utterly absurd situation based on reciprocal accusations of “jamming” has arisen and 
resulted, since the middle of September 2003, in the breakdown of telephone communications 
between Moldova and Transnistria causing considerable damage to the economic entities and 
population. Can we believe it is taking place in Europe?!  
 
 
Second Act – autumn 2003  
 
 October 15, 2003 – the Government of the RM took the Decision to establish stationary 
customs posts in order to apply the customs control rules to goods brought from 
Transnistria;  
 November 4, 2003 - the Transnistrian party suspended its participation in the sittings of 
the Joint Control Commissions.  
 
All these actions on “isolation” and “forcing to harmony”, etc. resulted in sizeable decrease in 
reciprocal trade between the sub-regions, the shift of economic entities from both sides of the 
Dniester to shadow economy and, as the consequence, activization of contraband and corruption. 
A seemingly unexpected surge of contradictions against the negotiation background arose to a 
considerable degree out of the fact that for the first time after 1992 the economic interests of so 
called elites – the old one and the new one – and certain “business groups” from both sides of 
the Dniester had been visibly damaged.  
 
As the secret came to light, revealing the domination of economic interests, it is time to liven the 
search for “common grounds” primarily in the field of economy. The problems which both 
Moldova and Transnistria are facing with are similar. And it will be logical to seek for the 
possible ways of their settlement together.  
 
The increase of the level of living standards and maintenance of sustainable economic growth are 
strategic goals for the both sub-regions. Reviving of real sector both in Moldova and Transnistria 
has been advancing slowly, thus the need of “second wave” of reforms both in industry and 
agriculture and social policy has come to a head. Moreover, both parties are facing with tough 
budget constrains associated with the necessity to maintain a social safety net while at the same 
time the burden of taxation needs to be reduced to encourage entrepreneurship and attract foreign 
investment.  
 
The situation is getting even more complicated if we take into consideration that for both 
Moldova and Transnistria the problem of external debt servicing is very acute and as a 
consequence brings about “twin deficit” in the budget and balance of payments. The problems 
like these are typical for many economies in transition but it could be easier to solve such 
problems within the frame of “common state”, involved in the stabilisation and reconstruction 
processes in South – East Europe.  
 
As time goes on the external factors can further contribute to a balanced and, what is most 
important, civilised conflict settlement. First of all it is related to the European Union 
enlargement to the East and surely to the new Neighbourhood Policy of the EU. If the Republic 
of Moldova will be the first-hand EU “neighbour” not earlier than 2007, Russia, Byelorussia and 
Ukraine will be neighbouring the EU as early as 2004.  
 
And what is more, now the concept of “common European economic area” is far more exceeding 
the frames of enlarged EU. It is mainly related with transformations of Russia’s and Ukraine’s 
relationships with European countries, strengthening and intensification of economic partnership. 
It is evident that such partnership will become stronger following theirs accession to the WTO 
and implementation of the Agreement on Common Economic Area signed by 4 largest CIS 
countries – Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan – in September 2003. The fact that the 
same countries are both key and common trade partners for the two sub-regions of Moldova will 
undoubtedly affect relations between these countries and the “common state” and at the same 
time between the sub-regions.  
 
The “political and economic” tension between Moldova and Transnistria aggravated during the 
spring – autumn 2003 has negatively affected their reciprocal trade. According to the 
Transnistrian Republican Bank data the share of the Republic of Moldova in total Transnistrian 
external trade has reduced to 9% (the lowest indicator over the last years). It is interesting that 
the most sizeable decrease was registered in Moldova’s inflows to Transnistria but at the same 
time the opposite flows of goods to Moldova even increased by 24%. And Transnistrian export 
growth to Russia and Ukraine amounted to 300 and 84%% correspondingly. It is also interesting, 
that according to the social and economic forecast of Transnistria for 2004 Russia and Moldova 
will remain the main Transnistrian trade partners within CIS (38.5% of total external trade 
turnover). And this is observed under circumstances in which the favourable conditions were 
created for Ukraine – products imported from this country are not subject to customs duties, 
excisable goods being the only exception but Moldova’s ones are subject to special 100% duty.  
 
A way out of the current situation which considerably damages both Moldova’s and 
Transnistria’s economies can be found solely by means of a mutual compromise including that 
on economic problems solutions. It seems that this compromise should be realised during the 
initial stage of transition period of reintegration and this point was set up in the draft agreement 
on settlement proposed by OSCE (July 2002, Kiev) but has never been realised.  
 
The attempts to de-block economic “obstructions” through official negotiation process have been 
to no effect for the time being. So, involvement of entrepreneurs and non-governmental 
organisations in discussions of economic aspects of Moldova – Transnistria relations would be in 
favour. These aspects are much spoken of: property, privatisation, financial flows, customs 
procedures, registration and taxation, free movement of persons.  
Why not to discuss the possibility for the parties to sign the document in which it will be stated 
that until the Constitution of “common state” is approved:  
 
 respectful attitude to the property in the territory of the both sub-regions based on mutual 
guarantees of efficient use and management of the property with consideration of each 
parties interests and interests of the future “common state” will be guaranteed;  
 economies of the two sub-regions will operate during the transition period within the 
framework of existing legal environments namely those of the Republic of Moldova and 
Transnistria.  
 
It is understandable that these suggestions are to be discussed. But theirs acceptance could in 
many respects defuse the current situation, mutually undermining and often absurd. 
 
 
 
 
2003: We managed to hold out, but failed to break through 
 
by Anatol Gudim 
 
 
The Government thinks “2003 will go down in history as a year of new achievements in socio-
economic development of the Republic of Moldova” (V. Tarlev’s speech in the Parliament, 
26.12.2003). But Fitch Ratings, an international agency that the Government respects 
(London/New York), evaluated, nonetheless, 2003 as “another disappointing year for Moldova. 
The government has failed to accelerate structural reforms” (5.12.2003).  
 
The truth apparently is somewhere in between. One could assess work of the Government, 
Ministry of Finance and National Bank as successful based on the fact that they managed to 
maintain macroeconomic stability, there were positive changes in industry, constructions and 
services, incomes of the population increased, but the Government’s activity along the 
reformation path has been mostly based on the “one step forward – two steps back” principle, 
which was the cause IMF and World Bank were so evidently disappointed saying that Moldova’s 
liberal-market economic course is being transformed into state dirigisme.  
 
PR-economy  
 
Any government has to produce optimism. And ours does the same. Results of the year, 
according to official estimates, are very optimistic: GDP grew by 6.8%, industry – 17.0%, 
domestic investments – 23.0%, export – 25.1%. State budget incomes increased by 36.2% and 
incomes of the population – 19%, including average monthly wage in the national economy – by 
31% and pensions – by 28%. Social sphere received 53.7% of the total expenditures of the 
consolidated budget.  
 
These indicators of “achievements” were published many times to confirm that actions to revive 
the economy were correct. It would be proper, though, at the same time to mention the risk 
factors as well that in 2003 intensified, rather than subside. Among them are: 
 
• Quality, structure of the GDP growth. Share of real sector is rather small within the 2003 
GDP growth (industry, for instance, accounted for only 11.5%). Its largest part is being 
formed in services, import operations, by means of banking credits, etc. GDP growth 
given such its structure is not equivalent increase of real resources at all. Especially since 
the budget has nothing to do with formation and distribution of GDP. Hence the 
population does not really feel this growth;  
• Unsatisfactory state of business environment, which shows through insufficient volume 
and structure of export (it is still less than the 1997 level), uncertainty of foreign 
investors’ disposition, freezing of privatization and preservation of a vast shadow 
economy sector;  
• Critical state of the country’s balance of payment due to almost double (!) exceeding of 
import over export, while after relations with IMF and World Bank had cooled off 
possibilities of receipt of currency through external loans and investments have sharply 
dropped. Of a little help is replenishment of the country with money transfers of our 
citizens working abroad – circa 500 mil USD in 2003;  
• Inflation leap up to 15.7% in 2003 (4.4% in 2002) and 20.0% increase in prices for 
foodstuff. Approximate 1/3 increase of wages and pensions also left its traces, even 
though wage arrears reached 175,7 mil MDL (13,3 mil USD). Danger of a critical gap 
between the need to expand monetary aggregates and capacities of the inflation-free 
emission;  
• Further increase of external (1,4 bil USD) and internal (2,9 bil MDL) state debt;  
• Unreformed state machinery, which is the cause many “2003 initiatives” either were not 
realized, or yielded small or negative results. Among them are: advancement along the 
way of European integration, implementation of the strategy of economic growth and 
poverty reduction, development of a competitive environment and small and medium 
business support, activization of export and foreign investments attraction, 
administrative-territorial reform, fight against economic crimes and corruption, 
rapprochement with Transnistria.  
 
All these circumstances are so evident that the President V. Voronin at the last in 2003 session of 
the Government (24.12.2003) pointed out that “programme goals of the Government are fully 
not realized and instruments stipulated for by the government action programme “Revival of 
economy – revival of the country” are not used to the right degree”.  
 
Look from outside  
 
Moldova from the outside is perceived as a country, where due to the inertia of the 90’s, but 
through other methods, “survival policy” is still realized and that does fail to activate factors of 
sustainable economic growth.  
 
The Government admits the same by implication through its forecast for 2004-2006 of a GDP 
growth reduction to 5.0% as compared to 6-8% GDP growth achieved during the last two years, 
while international organizations and rating agencies’ forecasts even lower – only 3.5-4.0%. 
Such rates cannot solve anything indeed. After all our GDP per capita (460-500 USD) today is 
the level of such exotic African countries as Senegal, Cameroon or Ghana. And in this situation 
Republic of Moldova, the poorest European country really needs a breakthrough in economic 
policy, consent between the government and the society on composition, rates and order of 
transformation of the country’s economy.  
 
We aspire to enter Europe. So here is a look from that direction at our starting position: “due to 
insufficient work of administrative machinery and lack of an efficient democratic control over 
the former Moldova’s economy encounters high level of corruption, informal sector making up 
almost 80%, which is why incomes from taxes are being lost; there is no control over the eastern 
border of the country and its social system is insufficient” (Resolution of the European 
Parliament on Moldova, 18.12.2003).  
 
What’s next?  
 
Unfortunately, 2004 is another pre-election year and, of course, there will be a lot of PR-
economy and promises. One could, nonetheless, insist that the country’s economy had already 
adapted to market conditions and therefore growth inertia has already emerged, and given all risk 
factors no one should expect any force majeure events (as a default) during the new year. There 
are encouraging signs that, economic policy will finally become intelligent and, according to 
Marian Lupu, Minister of Economy, we in for a “year of active actions” combined into five 
“baskets”: macroeconomic conditions for implementation of structural reforms; raising of 
competitive economy’s potential; social policy; elimination of infrastructural restrictions; state 
management system reform.  
 
The latter is especially important. During the nearest years it will be modernization of state 
bodies under the European standards, raising of the society’s confidence in the state that will be 
of decisive importance, rather than so-called market reforms. 
 
 
